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T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F A L B E R T A

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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

DWAYNE HUEBNER'S CURRICULAR LANGUAGE MODEL REVISITED

by

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A THESIS

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, for acceptance, a thesis entitled Dwayne Huebner's Curricular Language Model Revisited submitted by Duane Plantinga in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Education.

ABSTRACT

This study is an inquiry into Dwayne Huebner's attempts to revitalize the curriculum field by exploring various value frameworks for curricular discourse. The focus of the inquiry is primarily on Huebner's work "Curricular Language and Classroom Meanings" (In Pinar, 1975). In this work Huebner identifies five possible language systems (value frameworks) for curricular decisions. These include a technical, political, scientific, aesthetic, and ethical framework.

The first chapter of the study provides a short overview of the more recent interests in curriculum literature with regard to curricular language and also provides a justification for this study. The second chapter reviews some of the critical responses in the curricular literature related to Ralph Tyler's model for curriculum work--the behavioral objectives model. This chapter explores the historical development of Huebner's curricular language interests in light of the critical and reactionary tone to his works.

Chapter III of the study reviews Huebner's writings of 1960-1965 in order to provide an interpretive context to his development of a curricular language disclosure model in the mid-sixties. Huebner's strong interest with the notion of political influence and with possible modes of human relationships are explored as vital terms to his

rejuvenation attempts for curricular discourse. Chapter IV focuses on the five values frameworks and attendant systems of rationalization which Huebner proposes for linking curricular language with classroom meanings. Chapter V of the study reviews two fundamental motifs in Huebner's conceptualization of a curricular language disclosure model. The first motif reviewed is that of "necessity and freedom" in which Huebner highlights a tension between control interests and emancipatory interests in educational influence. The second motif reviewed is that of "learning versus symbolic transformation". This dialectical motif consists of both Huebner's reactionary stance to the concept of learning and his search for new meanings for the idea of educational change. Huebner sets forth the notion of symbolic transformation as a somewhat revolutionary concept which goes beyond the behavioristic concept of learning.

Chapter VI is a critical response to Huebner's understanding of the aesthetic and ethical dimensions proposed in his curricular language disclosure model. Chapter VII begins by reflecting more critically on the underlying interpretive methodology which Huebner makes use of in formulating the framework to his curricular language disclosure model. This chapter includes a summary of several critical responses by others (Ubbelohde, 1972; White, 1981; Wilson, 1982) to various aspects of Huebner's work. The final part of this chapter summarizes some of the possible contributions of Huebner's work to the field of curriculum.

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Chapter I: Dwayne Huebner's Curricular Project

Increased attention is being given to the importance of discourse in all areas of human endeavor; those engaged in curriculum work are not exempt from this larger interest. This study will inquire into this increased concern with the discourse of educators and what their discourse reveals by focusing in on the language interests of one particular curriculum worker--Dwayne Huebner. The study will revisit and recreate portions of Huebner's curricular writings from 1960-1980 which relate to his devising of a curricular language disclosure model (CLD model).¹ My intent in reviewing these writings is primarily to illuminate those contexts which lend substance to the more significant contours of Huebner's CLD model as he images it for us in his work "Curricular Language and Classroom Meanings" (Huebner, 1965a). Through the course of the inquiry my specific task is to illuminate and respond critically to this CLD model.

A common distinction² in regards to available discourse systems suggests that there are two orientations for curricular discourse: one, a language mode characterized by exactitude and clearly identifiable meanings; the other, a language mode, or modes, filled with allusiveness and with nuanced meanings that require different forms of interpretation. In this popularized version of two language modes a further suggestion has come about which tends to equate the language of logical exactitude with

rational "thought" and the other less desirable mode, with "feelings". If curricular study is to proceed as a science, it is assumed by some (Barrow, 1979) that its language system necessarily must be a scientifically based one. The current curriculum field, however, seems to continue with a proliferation of languages, models, metaphors, and controversy (Magoon, 1977; Paulston, 1980).

Much of the tension characterizing the curriculum literature of the past decade occurs whenever judgments are made as to which ideal language ought to characterize discourse concerning curricular phenomena. What is significant is that the discourse systems employed are no longer regarded as insignificant or neutral vehicles; neither are curricular discourse systems considered to be inseparable from classroom considerations, as is evident from the reaction to the Tylerian rationale.³ The language of educators is taken to be laden with intention. The uses of such intentional language are not merely program oriented; rather, the systems of discourse are understood to be of substantial importance in shaping the perspectives of curriculum workers, of policy makers, and of teachers, with a resultant influence on the lives of students. The discourse systems of educators, therefore, are understood to play a critical role in directing and shaping the day to day actualities of classrooms. Their latent intentions do manifest themselves in teacher talk, in policy maker decisions, in program materials, and in

goals of education. Huebner (1965a) proposes to disclose some of the key value orientations for understanding curricular language.

In light of the diverse ways proposed for talking in the curricular field using various models and metaphors (Aoki, 1979; Eisner and Vallance, 1974; House, 1979; MacDonald, 1971; Magoon, 1977; Paulston, 1980; Schwab, 1969) it is no surprise that a common language or meta-language is sought for in the curriculum field. The notion of conflict itself has given rise to numerous utterances, each with multiple meanings. Eisner (1974) calls the core tension in the field "conflicting conceptions"; Magoon (1977) characterizes it as "competing paradigms"; and Paulston (1980) uses the terms "conflict perspectives" and "paradigm clash". Such variation in orienting the discourse of crisis itself leads me to assume that any curricular discourse, even if it be characterized by supposedly unambiguous utterances, will not emerge as a commonly shared one.

The present inability to reach any clear consensus as to the "true" status of the curricularist's endeavors has led some curricularists during the last decade to declare that a foundational crisis exists in the field. Some theorists, in making their diagnostic-like pronouncements concerning the state of crisis in the field, have gone so far as to declare the "curricular theorizing"⁴ endeavor dead (Huebner, 1976; Schwab, 1969). This study

will pay particular attention to the writings (see page 166) of Dwayne Huebner, one of the above mentioned theorists who declared the theoretical formation attempts of the past few decades dead.

If the curriculum field is dead, as Huebner (1976, p. 165) suggests, then this study may well be viewed as an exhumation attempt for in it I engage in a reinterpretation of Huebner's curricular life-works. Although I may make the occasional comment as to the range of reasons generally offered for the declared state of crisis, the direction of this post-mortem inquiry into the field, given Huebner's judgments, is to search for that which gave his curricular writings life.

Huebner's Aspiration

In his works, Huebner occasionally hints at the possible emergence of an ideal language for the curriculum field. This hoped-for language he believes will free educators from their confinement to existing language patterns. This aspiration Huebner (1974a) describes as follows:

I intend to articulate the phenomena of education in such a way that school people can see what they are about and nonschool people can envision other possibilities. In so doing I intend, eventually, to provide a language that can reveal how the educator has decided to live in the world and what he sees as possible futures. (p. 37)

The desirable form of this revelatory language Huebner indicates at another point in his writings. "Given sufficient grace, the educator might even be blessed with

the highest possible form of human creation--poetic wisdom" (1965a, p. 218).

Such an emancipatory language, Huebner claims, could better deal with the mysteries, doubts and unknowables of human existence. These, he says, are "better handled by poetry, philosophy and religion" (p. 220). Such a language he seems to characterize as an aesthetic-ethical language. Ultimately he suggests only the aesthetic form can free the curricular worker's language from any instrumental valuing: for "No language system is so good or significant that other languages cannot eventually take its place--unless it is an aesthetic form" (p. 220).

Other than Huebner's work, I am not aware of any serious suggestions to seek for an ideal discourse mode for curricular utterances. Unlike Richard Brown's (1977) work, only scattered and piecemeal comments in curricular literature indicate a desirability for pursuing a new way of conversing in the curricular field. House (1979) mentions, however, that language will likely be one of the significant interests that will swell the educational research literature over the next ten years.

The literature emerging along these lines is concerned primarily with searching out the root metaphors which are linked to particular language events, and how these reveal the root ideological assumptions that particular groups of educators take for granted. The work of Michael Apple (1971, 1979) would be a prime example of the more

prominent literature oriented in this direction.

Huebner's search, beginning in the early sixties, led him to develop a curricular language disclosure model in the mid sixties. This particular model has been taken by some to hold considerable potential for providing ways of clarifying and criticizing the value frameworks permeating curricular language (Groome, 1980; MacDonald, 1971; Mann, 1968).

The Initial Context of Huebner's Aspirations

Huebner's first published works (early 1960's) appeared during a time when educational endeavors were supposedly on the threshold of radical change, if not revolution. The commercialization of television in the fifties and the post-Sputnik flurry have often been cited as major generative incidents of much of this activity. In retrospect, however, the educational endeavors of the early sixties seem to be marked more as a time of entrenching technicism in education, and this more in the sense of the entrenched thought of scientism than through the later ballooning of educational technologies. For example, in the more recent literature, the roots of the current educational crisis--if indeed it is a crisis--have often been linked to the fifties and sixties, that time of supposed revolution. Critical response to the technical-scientific entrenchment is especially evident in the reactionary criticism generated at the supposed fruits of Ralph Tyler's work Basic Principles of Curriculum

and Instruction (1949). Tyler's work seems to have been pinpointed as a key example of technical-scientific rationalism. Of interest for the purpose of this study is the question of how Huebner responded in those times.

Huebner's (1962) initial portrayal of the theoretical activity in the curriculum field during the early sixties describes it as being in an "inadequate state . . . overwhelmed by problems, and suffering from a lack of intellectual vitality" (p. 87). His brief summation of the field almost fifteen years later (Huebner, 1976) seems to echo sentiments similar to this initial comment of the sixties:

The poor health of the field is shown by the lack of vitality in its publications and national conferences, by the failure of so-called curriculum specialists or leaders to make an impact on national debate about educational programs, and by the general state of the schools, at least those within my ken. (p. 154)

Huebner's curricular works, then, during the sixties and early seventies, have as a rule exhibited concern with rejuvenating this "poor health" of the field. As a curriculum worker for the past twenty odd years he has persistently delved into many possible sources for curriculum vitality, tapping as it were the wells of diverse disciplines as if to find life, give life, and renourish life for the curricular field. In his desire to revitalize the dying educational vision, Huebner takes us on a tour of places not usually visited by curriculum workers--places from which increased awarenesses and possible worthwhile answers may emerge.

The Curricular Language Disclosure Model

Huebner's (1965a) curricular language disclosure model (CLD model, see figure 1) involves the disclosure of two major aspects of curricular language: first, clarification of five different value systems which he identifies as the technical, political, scientific, aesthetic, and ethical. Second, the attendant systems of rationalization produced by each value system. In a later work (Huebner, 1975c) he describes the kinds of language categories used by curriculum workers and educators in various situations. He terms these language categories descriptive, explanatory, controlling, legitimating, prescriptive, and affiliative (see figure 5). The first two aspects of the disclosure model will be reviewed more fully later in this study. The six functional categories will receive minor attention.⁵ Before I proceed to a more specific introduction to Huebner's writings and before I explore in greater detail his proposed curricular language disclosure model with its attendant themes, I will provide a beginning justification for this particular study.

Justification for the Study

Huebner (1966, 1975c, 1979b) holds that a curriculumist's theory is rooted in the language used to talk about educational activity; therefore, to understand a theorist's or educator's language is the starting point for inquiring into a theorist's or educator's way of making sense of

educational realities. One's language plays a significant role in the way in which curricular realities and educational activities are shaped. The importance of understanding discourse within curricular circles and in educational settings, therefore, may not be easily dismissed. One crucial task of any initiate in curriculum is to use and understand the discourse occurring in the whole curricular domain.

Familiarizing oneself with curricular language also seems to be crucial in that it assists in clarifying one's experienced educational realities. In seeking to understand the utterances of educators, one becomes more aware of how a particular educator's or curricularist's language may be shaped by different horizons of awareness; and by sharing in these horizons one is allowed to see how the practical decisions paramount to educational realities may be shaped by these differing perspectives.

All educators, therefore, are ideally expected to be literate and articulate within the whole array of pedagogical situations. Their increased language capacity may enable them to make sense of educational situations in diverse ways. If this occurs, then facility with a variety of discourse systems should allow the educator to be aware of the implicit directions offered in the diverse utterances so that the compatibility of these utterances may be judged in relationship to one's curricular actions. Taking seriously the discourse of others, as

well as one's own, is, therefore, assumed to be mutually beneficial. It provides a way of grinding each other's glasses, so to speak, so that both self and others may see more clearly. Not to foster this speech competency raises significant interpretive and critical difficulties. In many instances the pedagogue may inevitably live out of implicit or explicit assumptions concerning educational endeavors which may well be incompatible with his own root assumptions if not antithetical to them. The act of disclosure through continued discourse is, therefore, of utmost critical benefit.

More specific reasons for undertaking this study of Huebner's works may also be given:

1. Huebner's curricular writings, beginning in the late sixties, have been caught up in the long-running debate as to whether a field of investigation (science or pseudo-science) termed curriculum exists. He does not reject a theory for curriculum as impossible, nor does he attempt to formulate a theory. He contributes to the ongoing discussion by envisaging a different orientation to the question. Rather than debating the notion of which particular realities are within the sphere of investigation termed curriculum, he shifts our attention to the value orientations used to discuss these presumed realities.
2. Huebner's works have been given significant prominence within the scope of reconceptualist literature.

In the last decade this literature has come to be recognized as a major body of critical work which challenges many of the taken for granted assumptions of curriculum work. In Pinar's collection of reconceptualist literature (Pinar, 1975), Huebner is included as a major "post-critical reconceptualist" implying that he is striving in new directions rather than concentrating his efforts on criticizing past curricular ideas.

3. Huebner's works are noteworthy because of their global character. His works tap a wide range of sources for the curriculum. In light of the triadic inquiry models for curriculum proposed by some researchers (Aoki, 1979; House, 1979) Huebner has had research interests in all three curricular orientations. These three frameworks of inquiry are based on Jurgen Habermas' (1971) work Knowledge and Human Interests. In this work Habermas proposes that there are three specific cognitive interests: (1) the empirical/analytic sciences, (2) the historical/hermeneutic sciences, and (3) the critically oriented sciences. The first aims at producing nomological knowledge through an approach which is characterized by a strong technical cognitive interest in control. The second framework aims at intersubjective understanding of meaning structures and is characterized by an approach that has a strong practical interest in communication.

The third orientation--that of critical theory--adopts a critical-reflective stance which attempts to uncover hidden assumptions so that emancipation may be fostered.

4. As previously mentioned some commentators on Huebner's notion of curricular language see his proposed model as holding much promise (Groome, 1980; MacDonald, 1980; Mann, 1968).
5. An understanding of Huebner's notion of curricular language seems central to understanding the thrust of Huebner's curricular theorizing. If Huebner's developing of a critical model for understanding curricular language orientations tends to be restrictive, then its limitations should be highlighted so that its fruitfulness and barrenness may be illuminated. To explore, clarify, and critique Huebner's stance as expressed in his curricular language disclosure model is, therefore, the central interest guiding this study.

Chapter II: A Backdrop to Huebner's Curricular Concerns

In Chapter I, I discussed briefly the interest in discourse which is surfacing in the curriculum field. I indicated there that the direction of this study is to illuminate and critique the CLD model proposed by Dwayne Huebner (1965a). I also provided a justification for the study, which discussed the value of reflecting seriously on Huebner's journey as one particular theorist in the curriculum field. The key interest of this study was also foreshadowed--that being to interpret Huebner's language interests in the midst of his attempts to rejuvenate the curriculum field. Huebner, with his interest in revitalizing the field of curriculum, orients our reflections to many different possible sources from which curriculum language may draw vitality. But what is it that gives rise to all the talk of crisis in the field of curriculum? What is the fermenting agent? What is it that Huebner's works are a reaction to? A brief indication of some of the sources of fermentation may provide the reader with an awareness of at least some of the catalysts to discussion in the curriculum field. In this chapter a brief review of Ralph Tyler's objectives model as well as a review of some of the criticisms of that model will be provided. These reviews are not intended to be final reflections of the various models adopted but are intended only as a testing of the spirits of criticisms associated with the objectives model in order

that some contextual sense of Huebner's orientation within these larger prevailing trends may be provided.

A Few Sources of Critical Discourse

Much of the discussion of the past few decades of curriculum discourse continues to pivot on the debatable point as to whether curriculum is a special science with its own special sphere of investigation. Much of the critical discussion in the curriculum field has in fact been caught between legitimization efforts--efforts to declare the curriculum field a special science--or efforts to brand it as a pseudo-science. Some of the more profitable discussion, however, moves beyond legitimization and involves critical responses to particular views which are deemed to be entrenched misconceptions which dominate and stymie alternatives in the field. These critical endeavors have perhaps had the most impact on changing the language of the field.

Two significant publications that have served to generate much of the critical discussion related to the multivariated status of the field include Conflicting Conceptions of Curriculum (Eisner and Vallance, 1974) and Curriculum Theorizing: The Reconceptualists (Pinar, 1975). This latter work is a collection of significant discussions of new and diverse orientations to curriculum discourse, orientations derived from psychoanalysis, phenomenology, existentialism, and critical theory. Pinar's subtitle to the work, "The Reconceptualists",

has come to be a key descriptor for those who desire to encourage significant reform in the curriculum field. Decker Walker (1979), in a comprehensive review of the literature extending from 1969-1975 differentiates between those writers who appear willing to accept schools as they are while working to improve them and those who take a critical stance toward schooling which is so strong that schools as we know them would be radically reformed. The writings of the reconceptualists fall within this latter category. For Walker this group would include Apple, Cremin, Huebner, Joyce, Kallos, Mann, Musgrave, and Pinar (Walker, 1979, p. 300).

In making a further distinction within this second group Walker identifies one wing which "objects primarily to the class bias of schooling, to the socioeconomic, cultural, and political inequities it supports (Apple, Kallos, Musgrave)" and a second wing which "objects primarily to the violence done to the individual psyche by the society's (and the schools) emphasis on scientific-technical rationality to the exclusion of the more personal, emotional, aesthetic, and moral qualities of experience (Huebner, Mann, Pinar)". (Walker, 1979, p. 300).

But what does reconceptualization entail? Or, why is reconceptualization deemed so necessary? Since Huebner's works are regarded as a significant part of the reconceptualist literature, it is appropriate to turn aside momentarily to glimpse what it is that his works are a reaction

to. In the critical literature of the reconceptualists, Ralph Tyler's work Basic Principles of Curriculum and Instruction (Tyler, 1949) has often been singled out as the key work which reduced curriculum inquiry to a concern with technique--a technique affiliated with a scientific-technical rationalism. Taking note of what is deemed to be problematic about Tyler's work may serve as a backdrop to understanding the critical tone of some of Huebner's work.

The Tylerian Rationale in Brief

The most dominant acceptable foundation for the curriculum field seems to have been that which was set forth in Ralph W. Tyler's (1949) work, Basic Principles of Curriculum and Instruction. In his introduction Tyler outlines four basic questions which undergird his rationale for "viewing, analysing, and interpreting the curriculum and instruction of an educational institution" (p. 1). He admits that there may be others but posits the following four as fundamental:

1. What educational purposes should the school seek to attain?
2. What educational experiences can be provided that are likely to attain these purposes?
3. How can these educational experiences be effectively organized?
4. How can we determine whether these purposes are being attained? (p. 1)

Tyler's book then goes on to provide educators with his rationale; or, as he describes it "an explanation ... of procedures by which these questions can be answered" (p. 2). This explanation of procedures, commonly termed the "Tylerian Rationale" in subsequent curriculum literature, has generated much of the controversy in curriculum during the past few decades.

Part of the reason for this controversy is that Tyler insists on starting curricular discussions with the question of the purpose of education. By making this the fundamental question for all education, his rationale necessarily begins with the "conception of the goals that are being aimed at" (p. 3), or, ends desired. Educational objectives, therefore, become the criteria by which materials are selected, content is outlined, instructional procedures are developed, and tests and examinations are prepared (Tyler, 1949, p. 3).

Since choosing these goals, objectives, or aims is the beginning of the curricular process, value judgments are involved. Tyler, however, does not want the value judgments to be biased by narrow-mindedness: "no single source of information is adequate to provide a basis for wise and comprehensive decisions about the objectives of the school" (p. 5). According to Tyler, wise and comprehensive decisions concerning educational objectives must take into consideration the learner, the contemporary life outside the school, and the insights of subject

matter specialists. Philosophical and psychological screens, as value grids, are then used to select appropriate objectives for education. As a rule, Tyler's model for curriculum and instruction is criticized for the force of its linear logic or linear rationality--the system of thinking which accompanies the four fundamental steps which Tyler describes for curriculum decisions. This basic form of logic is generally referred to in the reconceptualist literature (Pinar, ed., 1975) as "means-ends" logic. This logic may be characterized as follows.

A goal is predetermined and a course is then selectively set to meet that goal somewhat like the way in which an archer chooses a target and then sights his arrow. After the course is run (or the arrow is shot), an evaluation is undertaken which judges the correctness (accuracy) of response in terms of how it matches the predetermined goal. How the course matches up with the goal is of much more concern than the "running" of the course itself. If it mirrors the predetermined goals, then it is deemed worthy. Evaluation depends, therefore, on the degree of fittingness (or overlap) between the stated goal and the course taken. This measurable degree of overlap (the outcome) is the deciding factor termed learning. That which is not mirrored, measured, or mentioned, is of no concern for it is deemed to be "off track", "out of line", or in the realm of the non-learned. Objectives, therefore, are seen as an exemplification

of the procedure involved in learning. Hence, writing objectives is taken to be the first essential step to teaching any discipline. Materials and resources are transitional elements in the procedure. Evaluation is like stock-taking. This universalization of objectives as the logic to all teaching is seen as an overriding characteristic of most contemporary education. Objectives are taken to be the definitives of education.

The grounds of criticism of the Tylerian rationale are varied and often tend to stay at the general level of accusation. But what are some of the specific charges against this approach? How does the Tylerian rationale in fact lead to the entrapment of educators and curriculum workers?

Initially, one could respond to these questions by taking note of the general framework to Tyler's questions. The order of the questions and the responses called for contain assumptions and elements compatible to a behavioristic view of teaching. This guiding framework serves as a dominant paradigm for educational practice and research. This procedure which Tyler outlines for determining educational objectives serves as a methodological principle. Apple (1972) regards it as a systems design methodology which seems to be interdependent with the behavioristic view of teaching. With its narrow focus on design considerations, the larger questions of possible educational change in terms of schools or

of society are not part of the picture. The commitment accompanying this design procedure--that of scientific-technical control--is also objected to frequently.

Some specific implications of this systems approach have been reviewed by Michael Apple. In commenting critically on how this means-ends form of thinking relates to teaching models, Apple describes the problems as follows.

The process-product rationality fosters an orientation toward efficiency in teaching based on a standardized product. . . . there is apparently a strong tendency, simply by following the logical structure of the system itself, for efficiency rationales to dominate. The result is that those elements which can be best produced and reproduced, which can be identified and are easily quantifiable, will tend to be given more consideration. (Apple, 1972, pp. 241, 242).

Apple objects, therefore, to the types of choices that such systematizing of procedure leads to. This approach, he claims, "generates pressure to be able to give clearly stated cause and effect relationships in a quasi-scientific fashion when, in fact, such relationships are logically unsound" (p. 242).

Related to the quasi-scientific status given to design considerations is the issue of decision-making. Design factors have a tendency to direct decisions related to development. Educators, in determining objectives, must identify the types of capabilities considered desirable and then specify the performances which will confirm these capabilities. The objectives, therefore, are taken to be the descriptions of the types of performance which will be observable on the part of the student. The teacher

becomes an extensive planner and technician who manipulates variables in the educational environment in order to produce the classes of predetermined desirable behavior. Apple makes the comment, however, that "the density of the reality" which teachers face will not allow for the process of conscious articulation of decisions and alternative structures during activity (p. 244, emphasis Apple's, 1972).

Paul Hirst (1974) also comments on this overt difficulty involved when stating objectives. He states:

To begin at the most practical level, it is surely a fact that we simply cannot adequately set out the total range of outcomes for a whole school curriculum, if only because we have no satisfactory way of mapping them and their interrelations. What is more, we could not begin to agree on any proposed set of outcomes at this level. (p. 22)

In a practical sense then, Tyler's quasi-scientific and technically charged procedure for objectives formation focuses too much attention on the basic design problem of simply stating what these are to be. The justification of value principles, because of expediency and efficiency design principles, end up being reductionistic. The linkages of teaching with learning are more complex than design parameters of the Tylerian rationale allow. Pragmatic usefulness takes precedence over judgments of ethical worth. The work of R. F. Mager (1962), Preparing Objectives for Programmed Instruction, is likely the most obvious example where design considerations of a behavioral pragmatic nature tend to divorce all ethical and moral concerns

from the deliberations.

Apple (1972) points out the conceptual oversimplification of the teacher-learner relationship as a major drawback. He argues that the behaviorist model views the behavior of the pupil as a function of the behavior of the teacher. He also indicates that the actual time frame for observable change to occur and the "very moral nature of the teaching act itself" (p. 248) are overlooked. The conception of the teacher-learner relationship in the behaviorist view also, according to Apple, leads to a teacher-dominated social climate. Classroom activity is "essentially centered about the teacher who determines objectives and teaches according to the primary criterion of efficiency in learning" (p. 250). Apple suggests that a more individual-oriented technology also is likely to prevail over group work and group inquiry.

In a strict behaviorist view of the teacher-learner relationship the student's act of valuing instruction is effectively bypassed or is a byproduct to the process. Expediency and efficiency, tied to the dominant interest to control, guide and determine the focus of all activities. In light of such considerations, it is obvious that a clash must develop between design principles and value principles. Design principles begin to override value principles when performance is reduced to required specific behaviors without paying attention to the wholistic nature of an activity. Often with the objectives model, with

its built-in systems thinking, it is assumed that small units of behavior--when added together--will lead to higher order operations of a composite nature. "Atomized" behavioral elements or knowledge are assumed to be additive. Apple claims, however, that in some situations, such as problem-solving, the specifics required are not yet known. This intrinsic fragmented view of the learning process tends to have significant influence on the types of classroom activities engaged in. Apple describes the effect this way.

The more mundane the activity and the goal, the easier it is to operationalize It is easy to specify actions relating to, say, collecting milk money or checking mastery of spelling or arithmetic, but one cannot be as facile with activities related to the emotional and artistic development of the child or, to use one of their own goals, assisting the student in developing a personal value system that will enable him to make rational choices. (p. 255).

If Apple's criticisms have any substance, which I think they do, then the design principles of a scientific-technical rationality will tend to engage students in trivial pursuits rather than in larger frameworks of inquiry and awarenesses. The tendency of the objectives model to major in mundane matters becomes a major concern related to the types of classroom activities engaged in. "One of the most crucial problems", Apple claims, "with a high degree of specificity of objectives is that, in the language of systems analysis, it tends to produce a closed loop system which provides little possibility for fundamental change or advancement" (p. 258).

Apple's review of various models of elementary teacher education ends with these final judgments.

They [the model builders] have limited themselves to the development of a scientific and technical rationality and neglected the political and ethical dimensions of their acts and the political elements of the systems designs they have articulated The reality of children's lives and the complexity of their search for meaning in a difficult world require a far more radical conception of teaching than the behaviorism of the models has [sic] provided us. (pp. 261-262).

Eliot Eisner (1967), another critic of the objectives model, identifies the following basic limitations:

1. It has not sufficiently emphasized the extent to which the prediction of educational outcomes can be made with accuracy.
2. It has not discussed the way in which the subject matter affects precision in stating educational objectives (for example, in art).
3. It has confused the use of educational objectives as a standard form measurement when in some areas it can be used only as a criterion for judgment.
4. It has not distinguished between the logical requirements of relating means to ends in the curriculum as a product and the psychological conditions useful for constructing curriculum. (Eisner, 1967, pp. 258-259).

Eisner concludes his criticism by claiming that behavioral objectives ought not to be used.

In summary, it is evident that the strong managerial overtones of the behavioral objectives model, with its particular emphasis on specifying objectives as measureable outcomes, calls for curriculum to be rationalized in a quasi-scientific objectivist manner which lends an air of expertise to teaching. The judgments as to what

is worthwhile are made not at the classroom level but often by controlling elites who are considered to know the science of objectives writing well enough. The gap between decision-making and practice is further widened when this attitude is adopted. Practitioners function as middle-managers of instructional systems who, having gained the technical expertise, control the variables affecting behavior. But in their concern with effectively meeting the pre-specified behaviors, the existential practical concerns of everyday classrooms are too easily neglected. Larger questions of worthwhileness, questions of the system's procedures and goals itself, and questions regarding needed societal change are not to be asked.⁶

Scientific-technical rationalism seems intrinsic to Tyler's model; and yet this model has served as a common framework for considering the curricularist's task for the past few decades. Perhaps it is questionable whether the zealousness of those who formerly adopted the means-ends logic of Tyler's rationale has waned. Much of the criticism generated seems to have broken the bubble of technical belief that formerly attended the Tylerian rationale. The historically oriented criticisms of Herbert M. Kliebard (1970) as well as the criticisms offered by other curriculum workers has led some theorists to reconsider their alignment with the absolute claims of the earlier scientific-technical rationality. The shifts of orientation by theorists such as Schwab

(1969, 1973), and Bruner (1971) perhaps indicate a loosening of the earlier absolutism of the Tyler rationale.

Chapter III: The Beginning Shape of Huebner's Writings

In light of some of the background issues discussed in Chapter II, this chapter will focus specifically on Dwayne Huebner's concerns in his early years as a curriculum worker. Huebner's curricular writings studied within the scope of this inquiry span the time period from 1960 to the end of 1981. Included in this inquiry are approximately twenty published articles and fifteen unpublished works or manuscripts related to various conference proceedings.

Huebner has not written any single comprehensive work which summarizes succinctly his views on curriculum theorizing, nor even a single work which encapsulates his own particular orientation to the study of curriculum. Titles of particular works such as "Curriculum As a Field of Study", (1966b) or "The Tasks of the Curriculum Theorist", (1975c) would seem to suggest that he has attempted as much. These works, however, tend to diverge to underlying interests characteristic of his larger concerns for the curriculum field. An overview of some of his concerns in these earlier works follows in order to provide a sense of the dynamics characterizing these early years.

Review 1: Huebner's Initial Journey

One brief summary of the broad contours of Huebner's "journey"--as he calls it--is provided in his introductory comments to four of his works which are included in William Pinar's Curriculum Theorizing (Pinar, ed., 1975,

p. 213). In this summary Huebner briefly mentions his "first time educational success and potential career in the physical sciences" (p. 213) followed by his interests in electrical engineering and the possibility of going into nuclear physics. After these physical science interests were abandoned, Huebner pursued an elementary education program in the social sciences at the University of Chicago. He describes his dramatic shift of interest as follows:

With my background in the physical sciences and mathematics, and the corresponding lack of background in the humanities, history, and the social and behavioral sciences, I struggled with the demands to use language rather than numbers and to be with people rather than with apparatus. (p. 213)

After two years of elementary school teaching, Huebner began doctoral work in education and sociology at the University of Wisconsin. The last of his three years he notes as being most significant. He highlights this year for providing him with his first exposure to interdisciplinary work, for the time it gave him in the library, for an advanced social psychology seminar with Hans Gerth, and for the emergence of his philosophical interest. "Of major formative value at that time," says Huebner, "were Talcott Parsons, Donald Hebb, Susanne Langer, Ernst Cassirer and Bertrand Russell. From that point on the intellectual development was strange, rather subconsciously self-directing, and increasingly alienating from my colleagues in education" (p. 214).

With these initial sociological and philosophical

interests merged diverse theological and existentialist interests. The general chronological pattern emerging from Huebner's description of his journey begins with his interests in the physical sciences and his subsequent repudiation of them. This was followed by his interests in sociology and psychology, with a similar aversion occurring, due this time perhaps to his heightened interests in philosophy and theology. In his writings, these phases never appear in such a serialized fashion for there is both continuity and discontinuity of interest in these various phases. Certain centers of interest emerge and disappear only to return, heightened in new ways, deepened, and perhaps left again for a time. Throughout his journey, however, Huebner questions the underlying assumptions of curricular thought. A constant warring between two opposing directional forces emerges: the one a reactionary thrust involving Huebner's attempted rejection of the positivistic sciences, the other, a forward thrust directed by Huebner's intentional search for new ways of "reconceptualizing" or "revitalizing" curriculum endeavors. This tension between two opposing forces characterizes most, if not all, of Huebner's life-long works in curriculum study. Later in this study we will pay particular attention to some of the vital dynamics which create that tension.

The foregoing provides a preliminary sense of the broad contours of Huebner's journey and a partial unveiling of some of the tensions emerging in his work. In a more

recent unpublished work, "An Educator's Perspective on Language About God" (1977b), he succinctly describes his curricular journey this way:

To understand the practice of education I have worked my way through diverse traditions and disciplines, for I have not found the language used by most of my colleagues particularly helpful in the search for understanding. Lately, I have come to recognize that the reasons for this discomfort with the prevailing language of education is the taken-for-granted, and hence unrecognized, positivism or scientism. But to reach this recognition I have had to move from the empirical sciences through the critical social and behavioral studies; from positivism through existentialism, phenomenology, and hermeneutics to critical theory and Marxism. (p. 1)

Review 2: Significant Early Works

Huebner's first published works seem to have little to do with his later pronounced interests in curricular language. These early works can, however, be interpreted as transitional to or for Huebner's more concentrated interests in curricular language. These early works are never left behind; some of the fundamental meanings undergirding his later language interests and later critical theory interests are foreshadowed in these first publications.

The published works from this transitional phase include "Teaching" (Bellack and Huebner, 1960), "Politics and the Curriculum" (Huebner, 1962), "New Modes of Man's Relationship to Man" (1963a), "Challenges Today and Constructive Action" (1963b), and "Politics and Curriculum" (1964a). Of these early works I take "Politics and the Curriculum" (1962) and "New Modes of Man's Relationship

to Man" (1963a) to be the most relevant to the formation of Huebner's later curricular language disclosure model. After a brief look at Bellack and Huebner's jointly published work, I will review the important terms of these other early works.

Huebner's first published work following his doctoral studies is a joint work entitled, simply, "Teaching" (Bellack and Huebner, 1960). This work provides an extensive review of three years' research (1956-1959) related to the study of teaching. Prior to 1956, the authors note, curriculum research gave little attention to the teaching act itself--especially as a social or educational phenomenon (p. 246). The authors contend that the teaching act had been ignored because the direction of inquiry in teaching research was oriented toward isolated studies in finding the criterion for teaching and for finding the predictors of teaching success. Bellack and Huebner call for a theoretical framework to guide the study of the teaching act. The key point they make is that "the isolated study remains isolated unless it is tied to other studies by a practical field problem, or unless it is seen in relationship to other studies by means of some theoretical framework" (p. 251). Their conclusion is that "the last three years of research (1956-1959) support the contention that recent modes of inquiry have not been very fruitful" (p. 254).

The call to establish a theoretical framework to

guide empirical studies is significant in light of the authors' suggestion that the modes of inquiry at that time were isolationist and fragmented; when used they are used because of methodological utility--that is, for the pragmatic easing of practical field problems. Bellack and Huebner call for a new direction in educational inquiry--a theory-guided inquiry into the teaching act itself. They do not want inquiry solely in terms of causal indicators of success (outcome oriented inquiry); rather, they seek an orientation which attends to description of the teaching act itself. They also invite a more critically-oriented approach to theory building. This new direction which they propose is rooted in their aspiration that better theories of teaching could be developed.

Throughout the review, hints are made as to the possible sources of promise. The works of Roberta Williams (1957), Chandler Washburne (1957), and Wayne C. Gordon (1957) are cited (Bellack and Huebner, 1960, p. 249) for bearing fruitful conceptions of the teaching act by casting "the teacher-pupil relationship into a sociological framework of reference groups and role conflict" (p. 249). Especially noted in the review are the works of Smith and Hughes, because:

His [Smith's] search for the logical structure of teaching took the form of a study in natural history; it was classificatory and descriptive. The authors contended that this is a stage of investigation which must be worked out before teaching can be understood

in its own right, rather than as a system of principles and practices derived from philosophy and psychology. (p. 253)

The authors cite the work of Smith and Hughes because to them this work suggests that teaching practices or actions reveal regular patterns, some of which may be more socially prevalent. For example, in the case of Hughes' study, it is noted that "the most frequent and pervasive functions performed by teachers were in the category of controlling. For most teachers the acts of control were well over 40 percent of all teaching acts" (p. 254). What this seems to bear out is that teaching involves intervention. The crucial question, however, is how such intervention is to occur. In addition, we may ask what kinds of control are permissible? Huebner (1963a) later seems to explore this root question in his inquiry into human relationships and responsibility.⁷ His language disclosure model, as we shall see later, also involves justification schemes for such intervention.

Bellack and Huebner's review also mentions the historical rootedness behind certain teaching actions. In responding to Smith's work (1956, 1960; cited in Bellack and Huebner, 1960, p. 253) they note that his studies revealed the prevalence of a describing, designating, and explaining pattern, in that order--which discloses a logical operation in teaching.

The prime concern behind Bellack and Huebner's review appears to be their advocacy that the empirical data

of educational inquiry must be understood and criticized in relationship to larger theoretical frameworks which have given shape to those data. In addition, teaching is to be envisioned as a naturalistic phenomenon, and the descriptions of these teaching acts must be criticized in order to move toward a better theory of teaching itself. That, it seems, is the new agenda they offer for curriculum inquiry. Aspects of this initial agenda do indeed play significant roles in Huebner's later works. The concluding paragraph of this joint work opens with the statement that "the researcher who is interested in the testing, refinement, and development of new concepts and theoretical systems has a life's work. The phenomena of teaching are there to be described and analyzed. From such efforts, explanatory and predictive theory is possible" (p. 254).

Huebner's later works, however, revise this initial agenda of "a life's work" for he undertakes to describe and analyze not only the phenomena of teaching but of classroom action and educational environments in terms of the value systems and rationalization schemes related to them. Such an undertaking, it seems, is more than a life's work, and, perhaps, its burdensomeness leads to disillusionment at times.

"Politics and the Curriculum" (Huebner, 1962)

Huebner's initial curricular publication, entitled "Politics and the Curriculum" (1962), calls for a new

and deepened sense of responsibility on the part of educators. Such responsibility, according to Huebner, involves an increased awareness of the ways in which power, with its inevitable link to conflict and struggle, gives form to educational activity.

The human capacity for influence is that which wraps symbol formation within political activity. Recreation of existing symbol systems involves mutual human influence. Not to act is to ignore, or, as Huebner suggests, to be motivated by a pseudo-democratic ideology. Yet, to encounter one's fellow being as an object is to use another instrumentally. Political influence--the presenting of power--must therefore be grounded in acceptance of responsibility for one's fellow beings. Responsibility in regard to symbol formation is rooted in human relationships. Huebner's interest in symbolic forms emerges, then, as part of this more fundamental interest in basic human relationships. And making sense of these relationships is caught up in his interest in competing educational ideologies. Perhaps, it may even be suggested that his later curricular language disclosure model is an attempt on his part to provide a descriptive tool as it were, to make some sense of the complex relationships among the array of symbolic systems (see figure 4).

What Huebner (1962) problematizes, however, in "Politics and the Curriculum", is something more specific. Even though this particular work deals with important

notions--such as "symbolic formation", "power", and "conflict"--that which Huebner places in the forefront is a central tension between a pseudo-democratic notion of responsibility and Huebner's own notion of responsibility, a notion which is based on being "transcendentally open" to the other. The former he claims arises from a "simplified conception of democracy" (p. 88) which interprets responsibility as an extension of one's function as educator. Such a notion, he implies, is generated from an instrumental view of human beings. Curriculum workers are unable to see that power is intrinsic to any human interaction for in any human social encounter one either influences or is influenced. Curriculum workers, therefore, should not shy away from power and politics in their thinking; "Power and politics cannot be separated, for politics is the form that power in action assumes" (p. 89). Responsibility, according to Huebner's interpretation, must be accepted as being grounded in humanity's essential humanness. This, he claims, is the sine qua non of the man to man relationship. This notion of responsibility is intimately connected to Huebner's ideas regarding symbolic formation and transformation and his notions of power and conflict.

Power in action is seen by Huebner as linked to the array of competing educational ideologies. He, therefore, pushes beyond the mere identification of the presence of power in the human relationships characteristic to

classrooms and schools. Huebner desires an enlarged perspective which allows for awareness and critique of the power of any controlling ideological elites, especially the dominant ideology of scientism. The curricular worker's belief that action or events in the classroom are only legitimate if their ultimate legitimization is derived from "scientific" educational research is strongly questioned by Huebner. Educational theorists, he claims, have too readily accepted the single-minded vision of scientism. For example, he says: "The producers of educational theory have frequently failed to recognize the multipurposiveness of educational ideologies and have moved hook, line, and sinker in the search for truth, as defined by scientific criteria" (p. 93).

With Huebner's descriptions of the functions of an ideology (see figure 2), possible alternative directions to scientism begin to emerge. An ideology, he claims, must "include symbols which facilitate the identification of the group with each other and with that which they have in common" (p. 92). The scientistic ideology excludes the importance of such symbols. To broaden the vision, Huebner suggests the need for symbolic forms which function not only as "identification symbols" but also as "vehicles which permit the organization of feeling and sentiments" (p. 93). These additional symbolic forms, he suggests, are to be sought in the arts and humanities and in "the whole body of philosophical, theological,

and humanistic knowledge" which have been "forsaken for a weak social science substitute" (p. 93).

Huebner's larger critique, therefore, struggles to limit the controlling influence of a scientistic ideology by counterbalancing it with an ideology that has a more humanistic orientation. Such a counterbalancing, he admits, is inevitably political. To move toward such a counterbalancing, he invites those with other ideologies to join the power struggle for

several conflicting ideologies could well exist side by side as different elites are united by, and push, different ideologies. The political struggle which evolves is probably necessary, and it behooves the educator to maneuver in the political arena more skillfully. (p. 94)

The search for ways to revitalize the curriculum field, Huebner suggests, ought to be pluralistic and undertaken with increased political awareness. On this high-sounding, pluralistic note, Huebner concludes his first major published work. He states:

There is certainly no one road to wisdom in the curriculum field, and the curriculum worker cannot depend only on educational research, psychological knowledge, or philosophical disciplines for his insights. He must be open to all thought systems which provide any analytical power. By utilizing concepts rooted in political science, the curriculum worker may find new questions for dealing with his age-old problems. (p. 95)

Important notions in "Politics and the Curriculum"

My reconstruction of this published work of Huebner's is by no means a total reinterpretation of that work. A few of the broad concerns which surface and which continue

to be of concern in Huebner's later works are first, his interest in exploring the relationships among educational ideologies, their symbol systems, classroom environments, and educational activities. Curriculum decisions are essentially social policy decisions. Secondly, a mild tension between a scientistic ideology and a humanistic ideology surfaces. Huebner, however, orients his interest toward one pole of this tension by juxtaposing humanistic literature, philosophy, and theology to the social sciences. This reaction, which only begins to emerge here, becomes much stronger in later works.

Perhaps of most importance to Huebner's use of the political realm as a possible wellspring for the curriculum field, is his appropriation of the notions of conflict and struggle, decision and choice. Classroom activities and meanings are inevitably controlled and shaped, legitimized and sanctioned, by existent symbolic forms (conversation and actions) which arise from the competing ideologies of various educational elites (see figure 2). Conflict and struggle between elites are at the heart of any formative venture in educational thought and action. Although theoretical debate may resolve conflict at the level of thought, power is the phenomenon which resolves conflict and struggle at the level of action. But what is the benefit of orienting the curricular questions in this way? Huebner answers, "A political analysis of the curriculum field might help redefine roles and locate new questions

to direct curriculum inquiry." (Huebner, 1962, p. 95) Attention to this issue of conflict and the inevitable presence of power leads to Huebner's fundamental call for increased human responsibility in the educational arena.

Political influence manifested in the vying for power as well as the issue of human responsibility are two notions which take on increased importance in Huebner's later works. Eventually these notions become central to his concept of freedom. The actions which man takes, or specifically, actions which the curriculum worker takes, must ultimately be legitimized by some ideology and that ideology must be one that frees humanity; not one which binds people. Perhaps what should also be noted in regard to this first major work is the absence of any significant mentioning of, or interest in, curricular language.

"New Modes of Man's Relationship to Man"

Although human responsibility was given somewhat veiled comment in "Politics and the Curriculum" (1962), it emerges as a key notion in Huebner's second significant work of the early sixties, "New Modes of Man's Relationship to Man" (1963). In this work Huebner indeed turns to some of the sources which he suggested in "Politics and Curriculum" (1962) as having been forsaken by the curricular workers and the theorists of education. From philosophy, theology, and humanistic literature, he puts forth his

root thesis regarding the nature of humanity, and he puts forth his understanding of the centrality of conversation involved with the modes of human relationships which he has identified. This is the first time that Huebner's works display a significant interest in conversation as a crucial mode linked to humanity's ways of relating. With this core work of the early sixties, we may begin to sense the interwovenness of Huebner's view of humanity, of human symbolic systems (ideologies), and of human educational endeavors. Notably, the foundations of his later curricular language model emerge. Because of the intimate connection which Huebner makes between ways of conversing and forms of encounter, I will reconstruct significant portions of this work.

The person-to-person relationship is accepted by Huebner as a given which cannot be questioned; "it is the sine qua non of human existence" (p. 144). Humanity is not free to choose whether "to encounter or not to encounter his fellow man, but he may choose to converse or not to converse with the man he encounters" (p. 144). Fundamentally, man is bound to fellow man; what remains for him to choose is "to find a mode of relationship and a way of talking about that relationship which offers the greatest meaning today" (p. 144). Huebner then poses a paradox: that in spite of humanity's essential relatedness, each person also is alone; that is, every person exists in solitude. With this key paradoxical notion,

Huebner suggests the following question for guiding the exploratory search into human relationships.

Accepting the basic mystery of man's relationship to man, and acknowledging that man wanders through life "alone with . . . other human beings", then what may transpire between man and man? This seems to be the question which guides the study of all human relations. The possible answers identify the various patterns of man's encounters with his fellow man. (p. 145)

Five possible ways of relating to fellow humans are briefly described by Huebner (see figure 3). One involves a non-social encounter; the other four involve social encounters. The first way of relating, the non-social form of encounter, Huebner calls instrumental. It involves functional transactions between humans in order that they may achieve "the basic and learned needs" such as food, shelter, clothing, and recreation. In instrumental encounters, "other men are encountered as means to an end, as 'objects-of-use'" (p. 145). These instrumental encounters, Huebner claims, are basic in the sense that "Man cannot live without economic activity, without his fellow man's being used instrumentally" (p. 146). These necessary encounters, however, must be transcended by the other four "uniquely social encounters in which man expresses his sense of freedom" (p. 146). These social encounters, of a transcending orientation, are, according to Huebner, "those by which man attempts to overcome his solitude and aloneness; by which he tries to break through the barriers separating him from his

fellow man" (p. 146).

The first three social encounters, Huebner claims, are to be "negatively valued as unhealthy or neurotic meetings, for in them man fails to accept his solitude, or gives it up, and in so doing sacrifices his freedom or that of his fellow man" (p. 146, 147). Following is a paraphrasing of these three negative forms of encounter.

First are encounters of denial, "in which man attempts to deny, ignore, or escape from his own sense of aloneness or separateness, or that of his fellow man". Man's "own individuality is lost"; he gets "lost in the lonely crowd". Man may also extend his denial to "the existence and aloneness" of others by failing to acknowledge them, and stereotyping them rather than meeting the other as "a person to reckon with" (p. 146).

Second are encounters of submission "in which man may recognize his aloneness or solitude and may seek to overcome it by making himself subservient to another"; and even though he may overcome "his sense of aloneness, he forfeits his freedom" (p. 146).

Third are encounters of domination, those in which man "seeks to overcome his separateness . . . by possessing the other, by keeping the submissive person within control" and thus "the possessive individual denies the other's freedom and his own, for he is not open to the other but is walled off by his own self" (p. 146).

The last form of social encounter Huebner contrasts to other forms as being the only form which allows man to attain freedom. In this form, "man transcends his solitude when he accepts his aloneness and that of the person he meets, and seeks a form of transaction which maintains the maximum freedom of each. . . . man freely gives to and freely receives from the person he meets" (p. 147). The key word which Huebner uses to characterize such an encounter of "openness" and "freedom" is the word "love". At this point Huebner admits to the "vastness and ambiguity of the many connotations of love" but also mentions how it is probably "the most highly valued form of human encounter" (p. 148).

Once Huebner has adequately established his basic notion of human responsibility as being grounded in a transcendent 'love--which is characterized by openness and freedom--he attends, for the remainder of this particular work, to what may transpire in man's ways of conversing. In fact, the title of this work may be misleading, for "New Modes of Man's Relationship to Man" is far more concerned with ways of conversing as primary modes of relating. The forms of encounters described, however, are significant. Although Huebner claims to describe arbitrarily these "possible ways of describing man's meetings with man" he does so in order to get at the significance of conversation as a mode of human relationship. The initial arbitrariness disappears and the possible

ways are accepted. Later these are incorporated, to some extent, into his curricular language disclosure model. Huebner's shaping and ordering of the various "value systems" in the disclosure model reveal a similar arrangement to his deliberate hierarchical shaping of these five forms of encounters in this earlier work.

I suggested earlier that Huebner's core interest in this article is with man's ways of conversing (given that certain ways of encountering fellow man exist). Further illumination of Huebner's predominant interest in conversation, which emerges here for the first time, will be brought forward later.

Review 3: Less Significant Works

Two works by Huebner from this early phase which I have not dealt with are "Challenges Today and Constructive Action" (1963b), and "Politics and Curriculum" (1964a). The first is a brief work which discusses the responsibilities in educational criticism of both the educator and the critic. The educator's "responsibility is fulfilled by his courage to act creatively in the face of doubt and his willingness to act openly that others can perceive the basis for his actions" (p. 116).

Here Huebner further develops his notion of responsibility. He again ties the roots of responsibility to Paul Tillich's notion of faith which must remain open through doubt. In elaborating on this earlier notion, Huebner defines faith as "the willingness to act with

confidence but always with the awareness, kept alive by doubt, that there are better ways of thinking and acting" (p. 117). Any "holding on to something as if it were the answer" (p. 117) must always be subject to being broken so that new forms may emerge.

This critical response, a "faith-doubt" dialectic, as I call it, is later linked in Huebner's works to his ideas regarding responsible symbolic form-giving, or symbolic transformation. Not to have this "faith-doubt" dialectic is to be locked into the realm of "necessity" rather than to enter anew the realm of "freedom". "Response-ability . . . [therefore] . . . is a call to respond [critically and creatively] . . . to the creative source of the educator's being" (p. 117, emphasis mine). We could elaborate by borrowing from Heidegger and Tillich to say that man necessarily has beingness or is thrown into the world of being without choice on his part. But he may act freely to transcend his necessary being. A slight necessity-freedom duality appears here with Huebner's notion of faith and doubt. Later we will discover that this dual framework shapes significantly the way in which Huebner characterizes his critical orientation to the curriculum field.

Further emergence of this duality takes shape in "Politics and Curriculum" (1964a), where Huebner distinguishes between two directions of research--the "search" and the "re". This distinction he describes as follows:

Empirical considerations should be uppermost in the REsearch phase, for only through empirical means are the instrumental values of findings identified and their power for influencing educational actions tested. Hence, the need for the curricular REsearcher to be conditioned by social science methodology. Yet other considerations must be uppermost in the reSEARCH phase for during search activity fruitfulness for educational thought becomes more important than power for educational action. The curricular reSEARCHer must consequently be conditioned by the methodologies of the imaginative enterprises--primarily poetry and speculative philosophy. (p. 115)

The "imaginative enterprises--primarily poetry and speculative philosophy", therefore, become crucial to the enterprise of curriculum inquiry as well as to the enterprise of searching for a curricular language. And it becomes clear also that the direction of that search must be toward a poetic discourse and away from a scientific discourse. It could not be otherwise. That the "search" is to become involved with a search for new language forms is made clear by Huebner in his juxtaposing of curriculum and politics in this article. In making the "re" and "search" distinction Huebner states:

to explore the relationship between curriculum and politics means to search for new language forms. These need not have immediate empirical validity. They are sufficient if they spark the imagination into new formulations of curricular phenomena. . . . Imaginative searching must always be ready to doubt the efficacy of existing language, and must attempt to keep language supple, refreshed and alive. By starting from a new vantage point, old problems may disappear and new questions may emerge. (p. 115)

For Huebner the existing language of curriculum, especially that which is valued "instrumentally", must be "doubted" constantly. But new formulations must also

constantly emerge. Stepping beyond the present "now" into the future "possible" is fundamental to the enterprise of curriculum inquiry and to the search for a new curricular language. And the important source of creativity is the imagination.

Much of this second work on "Politics and Curriculum" (1964a) is similar to Huebner's "Politics and the Curriculum" (1962). But in this work Huebner more clearly articulates his desire to shape curricular theory in the direction of social policy and political analysis. In a sense this becomes his definition of curriculum. He states it this way:

It seems more efficacious to conceptualize curriculum as social policy--a continual realization through classroom actions of the beliefs, values, expectations and desires of those in positions of control. As with any social policy, some commitments from the past carry over to influence present policy. Yet more significant is the constant, and necessary, struggle to have that social policy serve the interests of the dominant group and thus to keep abreast of the changing social scene. So conceived, curriculum can never have a final, complete design of absolute value; it is always in the process of becoming, of change, as is society itself. (p. 119)

Again, as in his (1962) first work, Huebner is concerned primarily with educational elites; that is, those individuals or groups who struggle for power and influence in order to control classroom action or curricular symbol systems. Yet he goes beyond restating his interest in educational elites and their ideologies. Increasingly his attention is turned to the curricular symbol systems. He identifies two areas of control:

The foci of control, or of the struggle for power and influence, may be considered to be the actions which occur, or in conjunction with, the classroom and the symbol systems which identify values, provide directions and expectations, legitimize actions, and foster solidarity Traditional curricular theories, proposals or statements have done little to lay bare the network of factors which determine classroom action, or to highlight the significance and operation of symbol systems in curricular activity. (pp. 118, 119)

Control of the symbol sphere then is, for Huebner, an important political device for influencing both classroom action and the valuing mechanisms (p. 123).

What noticeably occurs in this repeated interest of Huebner's in symbol systems is that "symbol systems" essentially is a substitute phrase for ideologies. And, as Huebner stated in his earlier work on "Politics and the Curriculum" (1962), "Obviously, ideologies are complex symbol systems containing a variety of prescriptive and descriptive elements" (p. 93). Huebner's interest, however, makes an important shift at this stage. His interest in symbol systems becomes very limiting for he now focuses specifically on language systems as the key symbolic form of humankind.

It may be postulated that the symbol sphere, in this case primarily the language system used by educators and laity, serves four functions. It clarifies and shapes value, provides directives for action, legitimizes or rationalizes decisions, and serves as a visible symbol of group identification or solidarity. (p. 125, emphasis mine)

This turn to the importance of man's language system becomes the new direction for Huebner's continued search for vitality to revitalize the curriculum field.

Initially, in Huebner's early works, it seems that Huebner's intent is primarily critical, yet, as we take notice of Huebner's sometimes reactionary comments and of his exploratory journey, we are drawn to an interpretive framework of selection that shapes generally the direction of his work. This interpretive stance is indeed critical and post-critical, for Huebner desires to be both creator of new meanings, and critic of old ones.

Huebner's efforts to grasp "life" (vitality) for the curriculum field, a concern which permeates most of his works, has created a two-fold direction to his work: on the one hand he searches for a critical framework; on the other hand he searches for a theoretical framework. These are intimately related tasks in his works.

Huebner's works, therefore, provide in a general way a theoretical structure for talking about and making sense of the diverse facets of educational endeavor. This framework also provides a hierarchical arrangement for understanding, talking about, and criticizing the curriculum venture. Huebner's deliberate importations from other fields is not to be seen then as whimsical drinking from just any ancillary stream; rather, his orienting during the search takes on a specific direction. In spite of this theoretical character to his work, Huebner repeatedly refuses to define curriculum theory in any one place. He has suggested, in fact, that a theory for curriculum is not needed.

In addition to Huebner's critical and theoretical concerns, there is some intent on his part to orient his work toward practice, or, as he terms it, "disciplined praxis". One commentator interprets Huebner's orientation toward practice to be actually oriented toward design (Ubbelohde, 1972). Such a judgment seems correct, for Huebner, in a somewhat dramatic moment, suggests as much. He says, "The study of curriculum [curriculum as encounter] is really the heart and soul of the study of education. All of man's knowledge, wisdom, and skill is required to build a just educational environment" (Huebner; 1966b). Such a statement seemingly indicates that the curriculum worker's task is not involved in theory building but in environment building. But Huebner's central interest in developing a CLD model relates more directly to educational criticism. His predominant interest in curricular language, I believe, is intended as a way for disclosing and critiquing education environments and not solely for building just ones.

The two-fold interests of Huebner's work, and the orientation of his diverse writings to his more predominant interest in developing a CLD model, suggests to me that likely the best interpretive way to discern what is deemed core or peripheral in Huebner's work is to focus on this curricular language model. The interpretive stance adopted must attend most closely to Huebner's way of shaping this disclosure model and must seek out the underlying

assumptions and the attendant interests adherent to this model. Huebner's later works--those of the last five years represented in this study--seem to be diverging from his earlier predominant interests in curricular language to more socially oriented critique.⁸

My intention, in light of the foregoing, is not to pursue a complete reinterpretation of Huebner's works; rather, my intent is to undertake a close interpretation of Huebner's curricular language disclosure model in order to illuminate and critique it.

Chapter IV: Huebner's Curricular Language Disclosure Model

Huebner's CLD model seems to have been judged as his most significant contribution to the curriculum field. That this has been selected as the most significant part of his life-work is evident from the reprinting of those articles primarily related to this model in Curriculum Theorizing: The Reconceptualists (Pinar, 1975). The specific task undertaken in this part of the study is to present and to examine critically this model. In this chapter, I will reconstruct Huebner's CLD model primarily on the basis of his description provided in "Curricular Language and Classroom Meanings" (Huebner, 1965a). In my reconstruction I will paraphrase extensively from Huebner's presentation of the model.

Huebner, in proposing a distinct direction for the development of a new curricular language, begins by calling for "release from the confinement of existing language" (Huebner, 1965a, p. 217). To transcend such confining language the educator must use the existing language--"the language of conventional wisdom, conditioned by the onslaught of circumstances"; such language must be doubted constantly and used humbly. "Perhaps tomorrow," he suggests, "the educator will have better language, if he stays open to the world which speaks to him, and responds with the leap of the scientist, or the vision of the poet" (p. 218).

The forms of language that Huebner sees as confining

or caging the educator are those selected from the symbol systems of the social scientist and psychologist. Embedded deeply in most curricular language are two key terms: "learning" and "purpose". These Huebner identifies as the two "tyrannical myths" (p. 219) dominating curricular language. He grants that there is sufficient truth or value in these concepts of learning and goals or purpose, and the language which supports them, to warrant their continual use in curriculum; however, to the extent that these notions are tyrannical and prevent the development of other forms of curricular thought, they serve demonic forces. (p. 220)

To foster the development of other forms of curricular thought, Huebner invites us to hear him out on his descriptions of other value orientations for making sense of curricular problems and phenomena. To do this he asks curriculum workers to cast aside the language systems supporting "learning" and "purpose", and challenges the curricular worker to "confront his reality directly, not through the cognitive spectacles of a particular language system". (p. 221, see figure 4)

The two major realities to be confronted directly are educational activities and the "existential situation of choice among differing classroom activities" (p. 221) Only then does the language issue enter, when the curriculum worker asks, "What language or language system can be used to talk about these phenomena?" The initial language

problem emerges then as a description problem, for those involved must find ways to talk about or describe this firsts reality--the reality of educational activity.

According to Huebner, "this descriptive problem is both a scientific problem and an aesthetic one, for it is at the level of description that science and poetry can merge" (p. 222). This problem of description is faced by the teacher, the supervisor, the curriculum planner, the teacher educator, and the researcher.

This problem of describing educational activities, Huebner claims, is linked to a second problem--"that of choice among viable alternatives" (p. 222). This is the second educational reality to be confronted--that of the "existential situation of choice among differing classroom activities" (p. 221). With this existential situation of choice the concern for values enters the picture for "selection among alternatives requires some form of valuing, or at least some hierarchy of values" (p. 222).

With this second reality emerges a second language problem--"that of making conscious or explicit the value framework" (p. 222). It is here that the whole question of educational ideologies arises. The existential situation of choice takes place within a value framework. "When values are explicated a rationality is produced which enables the maximizing of that value" (p. 222). These two issues, the valuing problem and the description problem,

however, are not separate problems but are interdependent because the rationality produced "contains descriptive terminology which may solve the first problem" (p. 222). Huebner then goes on to expand on his model by dividing it into two segments; first, the value frameworks or systems which may be used to value educational activity; and, second, the forms of rationality which may be used to talk about classroom activity. His model then, has a dual focus: value systems, and systems of rationality. The five systems with both their value side and attendant rationalities he labels technical, political, scientific, aesthetic, and ethical. Following is a summary of those systems (see figure 1).

The Technical

Huebner portrays the technical value system as being dominated by a "means-end rationality" like that of an economic system. This rationality he summarizes as follows:

End states, end products, or objectives are specified as carefully and as accurately as possible, hopefully in behavioral terms. Activities are then designed which become the means to these ends or objectives. (p. 223)

Two language systems legitimize and control this technical value framework: psychological language with its orientation to the notion of "learning" and sociological language with its orientation to "purpose". The postulated concept of learning is misused (reified) to identify ends or objectives concerned with the individual's status in the given and forthcoming social order by concentrating

on concepts, skills, attitudes, or other behavioral changes which are deemed as necessary to achieving the desirable social end state. The sociological language, with its concern for predicting the individual's place in the social order serves to sanction such end states or objectives. Objectives, therefore, under the guise of learning theory, are exemplifications of socially sanctioned end states for the individual in a given social order.

The technical value system is concerned with quality of production, with expediency, efficiency, and economy. Huebner describes it, therefore, in economic and industrial terms. Key curricular concerns of this value orientation are with control of the production system, that is, with manipulation of the material and human resources. The human relationships, Huebner seems to suggest, are instrumental ones. (Huebner, 1963a). The heart language of the technical value system--the language of "learning" and "purpose"--receives considerable criticism from Huebner throughout most of his writings. An exemplar of this technical value system, one which Huebner often cites, is the Tyler rationale which was reviewed briefly in Chapter II.

The Political

Political valuing is concerned with power, control, and influence in education. This power struggle gains political presence through the interaction of educational elites who struggle amidst one another for maximal influence. The ability to influence educational activity involves

social valuing and conflict between these competing ideological orientations. The positive or negative support arising from the way activities are valued circumscribes the activity with a political value. This form of valuing, with its underlying concern to gain social sanction, permeates the actions of all who can influence educational environments. In this form of valuing a rationality is produced "in which the curricular worker seeks to maximize his power or prestige in order that he may accomplish his work as effectively as possible" (p. 225). Ideally, power is to be a "means for responsible and creative influence" (p. 225).

The Scientific

Educational activity, when valued scientifically, is "valued for the knowledge that it produces about that activity" (p. 225). When new empirically based knowledge is produced and when "better warranted assertions" are hypothesized, in regard to knowledge about individual students, materials, or teaching procedures, then the scientific form of valuing is predominant. The attendant rationality of scientific valuing, Huebner claims, is often concerned with some form of scientific methodology.

Scientific valuing is concerned then with producing new facts and generating new assertions concerning educational activities. The two main interests, Huebner suggests, are with theory building and testing. We could summarize it this way. Theorists, in attending to the

empirical world, discover and formulate what they take to be a coherent set of laws which are explanatory of our empirical experience. This nomological theory is then taken by technologists who use it as a resource to create means of changing or altering our natural, social, or psychological world. Clear theory and practice positions are established. No clear commitment as to social responsibility rests with either polar position.

The Aesthetic

Educational activities, when valued aesthetically, are "viewed as having symbolic and aesthetic meanings" (p. 226). Three dimensions of this value category which Huebner identifies include psychical distance, wholeness and design, and symbolic meaning. The first dimension allows educational activity to be valued non-instrumentally. "It (the activity) is a conditioned object which does not partake of the conditioned world; that is, it has no use, no functional or instrumental significance, and consequently may partake of or be symbolic of the unconditional. It is possibility realized . . . spontaneity captured. . . . [it] is the possibility of life, captured and heightened and standing apart from the world of production, consumption and intent" (p. 226). The second dimension, that of "wholeness and design" allows the educational activity to be critically judged "in terms of its sense of wholeness, of balance, of design and of integrity, and its sense of peace or contentment" (p. 227). The

third dimension, that of "symbolic meaning" allows the educational activity to be valued for the symbolic meanings which it reflects--meanings that emerge from the individual educator as well as "from man as a life-form" (p. 227).

The Ethical

Educational activity, when valued ethically is valued per se, as one human encountering another. "The encounter is not used to produce change [technical], to enhance prestige [political], to identify new knowledge [scientific], or to be symbolic of something else [aesthetic]. The encounter is. In it is the essence of life. In it life is revealed and lived The educational activity is life--and life's meanings are witnessed and lived in the classroom" (p. 228). In this form of valuing, Huebner essentially describes education as lived experience, not a dry run episode of experience in preparation for a future social need.

The Systems of Rationalization

Huebner admits that the forms of rationality as he describes them in "Curricular Language and Classroom Meanings" (1965a) are not adequately developed, but states that "the general aspects are perhaps sufficiently developed to explore the dimensions of classroom meanings which may exist" (p. 228). He then goes on to highlight for us what he terms the possible forms of rationality which may accompany the ethical and aesthetic value systems; he does not discuss the forms of rationality of the technical,

scientific, and political. In introducing the CLD model he indicated that forms of rationality emerge when one attempts to make conscious or explicit the value framework. "When values are explicated a rationality is produced which enables the maximizing of that value" (1975, p. 222).

The Ethical Rationality

Huebner's description of the ethical rationality is developed essentially from the root notions of human encounter which he explored in "New Modes of Man's Relationship to Man" (1963A). Fundamental to the encounter is the "brute fact", as Huebner terms it, that the educator (teacher) "is but a man trying to influence another man" (p. 229). Proper ethical valuing requires "the humbling recognition that with the power to influence comes the lifegiving possibility of being influenced. . . . educational activity is ethical when the educator recognizes that he participates in his human situation of mutual influence, and when he accepts his ability to promise and to forgive" (p. 229).

One of the unique aspects of this ethically qualified educational encounter is that the educator

operates within the uniquely human endeavor of conversation, the giving and receiving of the word at the frontiers of each other's being. It is in conversation that the newness of each participant can come forth and the unconditioned can be revealed in new forms of gesture and language. The receptive listener frees the speaker to let the unformed emerge into new awarenesses, and the interchange which follows has the possibility of moving both

speaker and listener to new heights of being".
(p. 229)

The "encounter" is not merely a dyadic encounter; it also involves encountering others together, and encountering natural and man-made phenomena. These social, natural, and cultural encounters are all rooted, however, in the human "ability to respond". Huebner terms this "response-ability" (p. 231). This response-ability is essential to the emergence of new being, for, as mentioned, it allows "the unformed to emerge into new awarenesses" and this interchange allows for "new heights of being", that is, it allows for transcendence of the existing forms of social togetherness. Response-ability in speaking allows the individual human being to contribute "to the unveiling of the unconditioned by the integrity of his personal, spontaneous responsiveness" (p. 230). This creative process of unveiling is, for Huebner, the jugular vein of poetic discourse--that mode of conversing which he desires for revitalizing curricular language.

All human symbol formation is understood by Huebner to be "patterned forms of response-in-the-world, which carry with them the possibilities of the emergence of novelty and newness" (pp. 230, 231). Hence, he accepts that knowledge, cultural forms, and the various disciplines "must be seen as vehicles for responsibility, conversation, and promise" (p. 230). Language systems,

as the mediating link between these various disciplines, allows the person to participate in "the creation and recreation" of the world. The existing patterned forms of response-in-the-world must be questioned in order that new ways of existing may evolve. Thus "knowledge, used in the process of educational influence between educator and student, becomes an instrument of promise" (p. 231). This promise character of educational influence invites the student to find "new joys, new mysteries, new power, and new awarenesses that a full present leads to a future" (p. 231). This promise characteristic of educational influence therefore offers "fullfilment, possibility, and response-ability" (p. 231) to the student as a new emerging being.

The last concept in the ethical rationality is that of forgiveness. Huebner links the notion of forgiveness closely to man's finitude and fallibility. Through forgiveness, the educator avoids hubris (which Huebner defines as "the demonic state of false pride in the educator's own omnipotence" (p. 229). Forgiveness involves a freeing response; it is the balancing opposite of promise. "Forgiveness unties man from the past that he may be free to contribute to new creation" (p. 231, 232). Educational influence in classroom activities must be filled, therefore, with "the ever present possibility of forgiveness" (p. 232).

These then are the categories of meaning which

Huebner identifies for possible use in an ethical rationality of educational activity: response-ability, conversation, influence, promise, and forgiveness (p. 230). These meaning centers, he suggests, provide some of the possible sources for the emergence of poetic discourse.

The Aesthetic Rationality

The rationality produced when classroom activity is valued aesthetically Huebner considers to be like that of critical response to an aesthetic object. He states "the general scheme is that the teacher creates an aesthetic object to which the students respond. Their responses may also be considered aesthetic objects to which the teacher responds as a critic" (p. 232).

The aesthetic ordering of classroom activities Huebner identifies with "a search for beauty, for integrity and form and the peace which accompanies them, and for truth as life is unveiled through the acting and speaking of the participants" (p. 232). When "truth as life is unveiled", or the disordered is ordered, then the response is a mute one; that is, it involves "sustained attention" and "perpetual desire" (pp. 232, 233). Huebner, borrowing from Paul Valery (1964), believes that the order of the activity is there because of human intelligence dominating chaos; the ensuing order symbolizes the "meanings of man's temporal existence". This "ordering" relates again to the human capacity to "unveil the unconditioned" through creative responsiveness.

The "continual caging of chaos" is one of the initial concepts which Huebner believes could serve in an aesthetic rationality. The other concepts he identifies include "psychical distance or non-instrumentality, beauty or harmony and form, truth as unveiled meaning, and criticism" (p. 233).

Huebner applies this aesthetic rationality to knowledge and intellectual concerns which occur in educational activity. Knowledge, he claims, could ". . . be viewed as the ordering of particular bits of chaos. The irrational or unconditioned [chaos] constantly creeps out of all forms of knowledge" (p. 233). The one example Huebner provides is science. He describes how the place of knowledge in educational activity may be viewed differently when the concept of caging chaos is used. The irrational or unconditioned creeps out in science through

the continual destruction and construction of existing concepts and theories through the methodologies of science. . . . thus in teaching, educational activity must order, but the unbridled chaos should not be hidden from the student. To do so is to deprive him of the element which calls forth the mute response, the "sustained attention" and the "perpetual desire". (p. 233)

Knowledge, as envisioned in the aesthetic, may be "enjoyed for itself" in terms of "playful involvement" rather than being "subjugated to the demands of social or biological necessity" (p. 234). Hence, knowledge is cut free from the world of necessity and from any concepts of usefulness (utilitarianism). Thus "the student can be freed to use knowledge to heighten his own significance, to

enlarge his own sensitivities to the world, and to realize what he could be" (p. 234).

The primary concepts of "psychical distance" or "non-instrumentality", two other key terms in Huebner's description of an aesthetic rationality, essentially portray knowledge as an object for contemplation. This Huebner deems to be central to the power of the aesthetic. For Huebner beauty contains balance and harmony, composition, integrity and wholeness; these aspects of beauty "point to the peaceful possibilities, inherent in human existence" (p. 234). In using these concepts for the creative evolution of new forms, the scientist, the engineer, and the artist "bring harmony to a discordant world" (p. 234). Beauty's importance in the context of classroom activities serves a similar purpose:

Participating in the making of his own knowledge, the student can recognize his inherent potential to add to, and conversely to subtract from, the possibility of man-made beauty. Intellectual disciplines as well as esthetic crafts are vehicles for this continuing creation. (p. 234)

As participating agents in the world through creative form-making, the student and a teacher presumably create beauty. The action of creation itself however, Huebner seems to bypass; he provides instead generalized statements as to the possibility of beauty. The resulting aesthetic forms, however arrived at, Huebner sees as "symbolic of man's meanings and of his discovered truths".

The act of criticism, a complementary act to creation,

is the last concept identified by Huebner as part of an aesthetic rationality. These critical acts vary with each value system. For example, Huebner states that the "scientific criteria of empirical validity, parsimony, and logical structure are instruments for the criticism of scientific knowledge. Pragmatic considerations can be a form of criticism of social ideologies" (p. 235). The importance of this critical act he summarizes as follows: "Teacher and student, through their conversations, engage in the mutual criticism of each other's orderings, and thus contribute to the continued transcendence of form over chaos" (p. 234).

Chapter V: The Web Creating Tension within Language

In my undertaking of this study, a key guiding question has been, "What fundamental questions are Huebner's writings an answering to?" By searching through the questions that Huebner attempts to provide answers for, we are able to witness and interpret his ongoing exploratory responses to various issues in the field of curriculum. My particular interest, however, has been oriented toward the meanings emerging in relationship to Huebner's curricular language disclosure model. I have highlighted in Chapter IV the dual aspect of that model, that is, the value framework and the attendant rationalization schemes.

Chapters II and III attempted to provide a context for Huebner's CLD model by searching out some of those key ideas which were established in Huebner's earlier works. The mature model, described in Chapter IV, seems to be the most important work among Huebner's writings between 1965 and 1970. In this chapter, I shall begin to provide a clearer understanding of that model as I interpret its form within the midst of the corpus of Huebner's works.

Central to this task of interpretation is an understanding of some of the links Huebner makes between ideologies, conversation, and educational activities. The key concepts brought forward here arise from review of his earlier works "Politics and the Curriculum" (1962) and "New Modes of Man's Relationship to Man" (1963a).

Ideologies and Classroom Activities

Huebner's CLD model attempts to grasp and make sense of the relationships among various competing ideologies and the kinds of values generated to legitimize educational activities. In a sense he seeks for a bridge between various thought systems and the actions undertaken presumably under their directive influence. Particular ideologies attempt to legitimate certain kinds of practices. Conversation, however, is singled out by Huebner as a key agent that elites use in influencing educational environments: "the control of the symbol sphere is a political device for influencing both classroom action and the valuing mechanisms" (Huebner, 1962).

Intertwined with the description and critique of the various symbol systems of educational elites are the key concepts of power and conflict, as well as Huebner's call for responsible influence. Those groups who have power over the "valued activities", Huebner terms "elites". Educational elites are "the group among all interested groups with the power to make the decision or to sanction the acts" (Huebner, 1962, p. 90). But to wield power they must be unified. They must be an interest group which has found a basis for cohesion and are thereby enabled to act in concert, thus influencing "a number of classrooms in a community or other sociopolitical units" (Huebner, 1962, p. 92). Of particular interest to Huebner is the ways in which conversation brings about identity and

cohesion to elite groups.

By using the political notion of elites and ideologies, Huebner (1962) believes he may bypass the problem of defining the word curriculum. This political orientation to his work leads Huebner on a search for ways to make sense of the various interest groups (educational elites) who may control the decisions and actions in classrooms. Classroom action in a sense goes beyond the narrow notion of curriculum as materials; the notion of action is much larger and much stronger than the notion of resources or materials for it implies the influential potential of materials, resources, and people. For Huebner, the traditional sense of resources and attendant strategies or methodologies are subsumed under notions of action and decision.

Huebner sees the basic referent for the discussion of curriculum as being the individual classroom. He sums up the foundational orientation for curriculum this way:

The key curricular questions, rather neutral from most descriptive and value points of view, are "What can go on in the classroom?" and "How can this activity be valued?" The central notion of curricular thought can be that of "valued activity". All curricular workers attempt to identify and/or develop "valued educational activity". (Huebner, 1965a, p. 222)

In the typical classroom "are one or more teachers or other resource people having various competencies or skills, a student or group of students with identifiable characteristics, resources of various kinds, and limited time. The interactions among teachers, students, and

resources within a given duration of time constitute the acts which can be controlled and sanctioned" (Huebner, 1962, p. 90). Decision making is involved in all of these. The aspects of a typical classroom which he identifies are not significantly different than those which Venerable (1967) described.⁹ But Huebner's interest is in who it is that provides the influential direction in all of this. He directs our attention, therefore, to those who give form to the activities in classrooms. On what grounds do they prescribe this or that form? What and whose controls and sanctions influence the shape of classroom action or interaction patterns?

Earlier Huebner (1962, 1964a) sketched the characteristics of educational elites and educational ideologies.

Ideologies were characterized by Huebner as socialization forces. 'An elite group of people who share common prescriptive and descriptive symbolic systems with certain attendant ideals vie for power with the intent to induct school children into their particular communal symbol system. One of the key interests of schooling is, therefore, the purposeful channeling of children into various social roles. To use a Dickensian metaphor, we could say that their intent is to mould children into predetermined forms as if education involved the tooling of cogs for the social machinery of society. In his criticisms of the technical language affiliated with such an elite, Huebner suggests that the root interests are based upon

a view of man which defines him according to his functional role or technical fit to a predetermined "station in life". Such a person's exercising of responsibility is based only on his functional capacity in society. Schooling, in such a view, is understood as necessary conditioning. For Huebner, the human self must be freed from this conditioning of being.

According to Huebner, crossing the threshold to freedom involves intense struggle, for the relationship between the individual and his or her social group is a complex one. The crux of educational responsibility arises in the exercising of this relationship, for the individual child is inescapably caught up with others attempting to determine his destiny. Huebner's notion of responsibility, therefore, insists that the power element is present. Responsibility involves an inherent influential aspect; it demands intervention by educators in the lives of children. In fact it is this notion of response-ability as demanding intervention characterized by promise and forgiveness that makes the classroom such an awesome place in Huebner's eyes, for here one human being dares to influence another. How he dares to go about doing this becomes an overriding concern in Huebner's thought.

His language model, therefore, is an attempt to critically link up ideological interests to classroom conditionedness, not in any direct way but by orienting

the kinds of rationalization schemes used to the central values systems they derive from. Huebner's model, with its classroom oriented focus, attempts to provide a schematization for clarifying and critiquing the possible value systems used to legitimize educational activities. His intent, it seems, is not only to find a way of describing these value systems, but also to devise a model for generating criticism of these value frameworks. One of his major intents, then, is to describe and critique the value systems of various educational ideologies that are influential in educational environments.

The advantage to this critique of value frameworks is that Huebner does not get caught up in the debate as to what activities should exist in classrooms; obviously, the answer to that question will depend on the value system of the controlling educational elite. He orients our attention, therefore, in such a way that we become more aware of which interest groups may control the decisions which permit or disallow certain resources (people and/or materials) into the classroom.

Activities, valued within the various five value frameworks, are basically projects generated by various ideological groups. Their value framework is inevitably hinged to the cohesive foundational meanings of each competing elite. These meanings form their central bonds of identity. For their particular values to be rendered influential, a political struggle is involved.

With this particular way of orienting his discussion of curriculum, we can see that Huebner's critical venture in his curricular language disclosure model has a dual focus: its intentions are both critical and theoretical. And intimately tied to this critical-theoretical orientation is Huebner's prime focus on the notion of "conversing"; and this notion is linked inextricably to his understanding of human responsibility.

The context of this notion of conversing, with its emphasis on the human potential for symbolic transformation, is permeated with two underlying motifs which tend to create an interesting constellation of meanings to Huebner's model. These motifs serve as a presuppositional web to Huebner's understanding of all human endeavors in education. These underlying motifs, with their attendant constellation of meanings, are of such a presuppositional nature that they have much to do with the dynamics of Huebner's curricular language disclosure model. They also have much to do with the way in which he understands the essential nature of humanity and the world in which humanity dwells. From reviewing these fundamental motifs we can gain a vital understanding of the interpretive framework to Huebner's new curricular language and its suggested orientation for curriculum. The first major motif which I will reconstruct is that of necessity and freedom.

The Necessity and Freedom Motif

In moving toward an understanding of this motif we need to attend closely to what Huebner deems to be the chief trouble spot of the educational enterprise. Educators, he claims, are caught in the web of today's existing curricular language, a language which is dominated by "dangerous, non-recognized myths" arising from the language systems of social scientists and psychologists (Huebner; 1965a, p. 219). This historically passed-on language confines the curricularist by conditioning the curricular worker's language with tyrannical notions such as learning and purpose. Such language allows the curricular worker to believe that all educational activities must be goal oriented because of the teachings of the social scientist and psychologist which hold that all human behavior is caused and has purpose. The curricular worker is, therefore, stuck with the "conventional wisdom" of the social sciences and of psychology--stuck in an essentially technical-scientific language. This locked-in technical-scientific language reduces the fullness of the educator's fellow being to a controllable, predictable entity that is instrumentally used. What educators require is a language which frees them from the conditioning of conventional wisdom.

A technical-scientific language base conditions the educator to put all of his trust in scientifically verifiable knowables. Limited by such a language the educator

neglects to see mystery, doubt, and the unknown which ought to fill him with awe when confronting fellow human beings and the world around him. The educator's existing language, therefore, hides the fullness of the educational act--an act in which one human being inevitably influences another. The existing language systems are, therefore, taken to be reductionistic. Huebner's strong critical reaction to this form of reductionism of man is dramatically shown in the following.

Indeed, curricular language seems rather ludicrous when the complexity and the mystery of a fellow human being is encompassed in that technical term of control--the "learner". Think of it--there standing before the educator is a being partially hidden in the cloud of unknowing. For centuries the poet has sung of his near infinitudes; the theologian has preached of his depravity and hinted of his participation in the divine; the philosopher has struggled to encompass him in his systems, only to have him repeatedly escape; the novelist and dramatist have captured his fleeting moments of pain and purity in never-to-be-forgotten esthetic forms; and the man engaged in curriculum has the temerity to reduce this being to a single term--"learner". (Huebner; 1965a, p. 219)

To release the curricular worker from the snares of such technical-scientific reductionism, Huebner aspires to refresh the conditionedness of existing curricular language. This aspiration he expresses as follows.

Perhaps tomorrow the educator will have better language, if he stays open to the world which speaks to him, and responds with the leap of the scientist, or the vision of the poet. (p. 218)

In Huebner's writings the terms "necessity" and "freedom" occur, frequently juxtaposed. His use of these terms is often interchangeable with many other terms:

"conditioned" and "unconditioned", "continuity" and "discontinuity", "succession" and "duration", the "bound" and the "free", or the "ordered" and the "chaotic". In juxtaposing these terms, however, Huebner sets them apart as polar opposites which have interpolar interaction.

In Huebner's CLD model, three of the value frameworks--the technical, political, and scientific--are oriented toward the realm of necessity, that is, in the direction of empirical concerns. The aesthetic and ethical frameworks, however, with their value clusters being non-instrumental, are oriented toward the realm of freedom. His fundamental critique of learning and purpose relates to the empirical orientation. His orientation toward the aesthetic and ethical frameworks, however, is a call for intrinsic value and non-instrumentality.

In the polar-like juxtaposition of the necessity-freedom scheme, Huebner speaks of the "conditioned", or the realm of necessity, as belonging to "the world of man's technique". When he discusses the unconditioned or the realm of freedom, he is referring to "the world of man's spirit." In his frequent use of this necessity-freedom scheme, Huebner's directional thrust, or the orientation of his own understandings, is toward this "world of man's spirit". Within the web of this specific motif emerges his larger understanding of humanity, of humanity-in-the-world, and of humanity educationally acting in the world with fellow human beings in influential ways.

A sense of this necessity-freedom motif is most noticeable in "Curriculum as a Field of Study" (1966b) and in "Curriculum as Concern for Man's Temporality" (1967b). A brief review of these works can disclose the thrust of this motif and the tensions it creates.

Huebner begins "Curriculum as a Field of Study" (1966b) with four basic propositions which clearly indicate the direction in which he intends to orient the curriculum field. In the first proposition he states:

Current conceptions of curriculum are inadequate, in that they tie the educative process only to the world of man's technique, and exclude ties to the world of his spirit. (Huebner, 1966b, p. 94)

Related to this key proposition is Hueber's belief that "the world of man's technique" is governed by a technical-scientific rationality. Characteristic of this orientation are the concerns tied to man's necessary existence or man's temporality--concerns with needs, goals, objectives, and purposeful activity. In his second proposition, Huebner argues that the inadequacy of current conceptions of curriculum "stems from an overdependency upon a conception of value as goals or objectives, and a consequent overdependency upon learning as the major characteristic of man's temporality" (p. 94). The thrust of his argument is that such a conception of educational activity binds man to the conditioned world of technique and locks him into a language dominated by a technical consciousness. He states: "Technique is already firmly, although perhaps

not permanently, institutionalized in the means-ends language which guides the education process" (Huebner, 1966, p. 96).

Symbolic systems, it must be remembered, guide human action. Technique, therefore, is entrenched in educational environments through the language of educators. A technically oriented ideology is assumed, therefore, to be an intimate part of educational discourse. The attendant meanings of such an ideology shape not only the education process but, by doing so, shape also the emerging nature of people dwelling in that particular educational environment in a way that is in keeping with the world of man's technique.

In this discussion of technique, it should be noted that Huebner does not reject technical developments in school. In his view, "technical developments point to what man is [necessary being] and what he can be [free responding being] as much as the arts" (Huebner, 1975b, p. 96). He accepts that technological developments allow the evolution of new possibilities in man. But in the way in which educators value technical development, Huebner implies that they are serving technique rather than having technique serve them. Most educators, therefore, are seemingly in bondage to the world of necessity and technique. Most, Huebner states, "seem unaware of their involvement with and commitment and subservience to the self-augmenting technological order. Their curriculum

language hides this reality from them" (Huebner, 1966b, p. 97, emphasis mine).

Huebner's second proposition, which involves his criticism of learning theory, is central to his critique of this mastery by technique over the world of spirit. Learning theory is the cause of the inadequacy in current conceptions of curriculum. Learning theory, he claims, is "the handmaiden of technique in the schools. It subjects teacher, material, and organization to the system. Theoretically, it prescribes the means, and tells teachers and students how to act" (Huebner, 1966b, p. 97). Learning theory, as a significant component in the ideological orientation of a technical rationality, offers a language of cohesiveness with which educators can be affiliated and it offers a controlling, explanatory, and descriptive language to make sense of and explain what it is that they are about when encountering others.

In his criticism, Huebner qualifies his position by stating that he is "not against learning theories. As a language system in psychology, they exhibit man's transcendent spirit, his ability to reach out into the unknown" (Huebner, 1966b, p. 97). In fact, learning theories, if they are used to facilitate the construction of just educational environments, may be tools of liberation. Teachers may become free agents again, for "the moment there is more than one technique available for the classroom, the teacher enters the realm of freedom

and awesome choice" (Huebner, 1966b, p. 98). Huebner seems to claim here that as long as learning theory is under the direction of ethical guidelines which shape decision-making in a moral manner, then the choices made will serve an emancipatory role. When learning theories usurp this role and come to control and dominate through a predictive behavioral framework, then it must be regarded as manipulative and tyrannical.

A fundamental presupposition that Huebner accepts, then, is the notion of struggle and conflict between the world of man's technique and the world of man's spirit. He also clearly indicates his choice as to the direction in which that struggle must seek resolution. To be released from servitude to existing curricular language, a new language must be developed that is spirit-oriented rather than technique-oriented. If such a shift occurs then the creative potential of technique itself may join in freeing humanity.

This inner tension between spirit and technique is linked to other notions as well. For example, Huebner identifies the notions of constancy and change, or, continuity and discontinuity as crucial to understanding this warring between the world of technique and spirit. A major work in which he discusses this is "Curriculum as Concern for Man's Temporality" (Huebner, 1967b, p. 237). Here, Huebner attempts to counterbalance the technique-oriented curricular language--the language of objectives and of

learning.

This first language category, that of goals and purpose, he describes as being future oriented. Educational activity is valued as a means to some future state which is deemed desirable. The past is inspected and a selection of historical modes of existence is set up as the valued forms for future existence (Huebner, 1967b, p. 238). This process he summarizes as follows:

Basically, the determination of objectives is the search for the bridge between the past and the future; it is argument over the degree of continuity necessary for change, or the amount of change that is necessary for continuity; it is concern for the balance between succession and duration. (p. 238)

In Huebner's concept of change he rejects the search for goals, characterizing it as a "fanciful" and "idle" one (p. 239). He claims that such an orientation allows "educators to drop out of the troublesome political process of living historically. . . . It is too easy to forget that debate about educational objectives is part of the continuous struggle of rival political ideologies, which has its consequences in who controls the educational environments" (1967b, p. 239).

Huebner suggests that such a fascination with arriving at statements of desirable end states for the future tends to ignore the present. The educational act, an act of confrontation and influence between educator and student, is leaped over as an insignificant aspect of pedagogy. The focus is on past desirable forms that

will ensure constancy and stability for society in the future; yet the student being dealt with tends to be ignored.

Learning, according to Huebner, emphasizes a concern with "those aspects of his [humanity's] being which appear to be continuous and those which appear to change" (Huebner, 1967b, p. 240). If change is deemed necessary in order for a person to fit the new continuities of society then change itself is the phenomenon of most importance educationally if society itself is characterized by discontinuity. In reconceptualizing the phenomenon of human change, Huebner desires to go beyond the postulated concept of learning with its emphasis on behavior change in an individual. Such a notion is caught up in explaining how certain aspects of behavior are changed (Huebner, 1967b, p. 240). In place, he suggests that this phenomenon of change (individually and socially) "forces a relook at the nature of man" (p. 241). A broader, culturally-rooted interpretation of humanity is needed.

Humanity, in Huebner's refocus on human nature, is characterized by the potential for change. And humanity's capacity for "creativity" is the key to that potential. Non-change suggests behavior patterning or fixation which have come to "fix" humanity as being in a certain state. Human beings, as transcendent beings, are typified by their "capacity to transcend what he [humanity] is to become something that he is not" (Huebner, 1967b, p. 241). This

creative capacity allows humanity to "participate in both the conditioned and unconditioned, or in necessity and freedom" (Huebner, 1967b, p. 241).

Huebner, therefore, shifts our understanding of man away from the notion of man as in a fixed state of existence. He invites us to see that such conditionedness in man is due to the world of necessity and technique imposing its forms on man. Only man's creative capacity allows him to transcend the formed (past) and to confront the not yet formed (future) by engaging in the present, and doing so primarily through political activity! This creative capacity is essential to the temporality of man for "man is above all else a being caught in succession and duration, or change and continuity" (p. 243). Another way of phrasing it would be to use Heidegger's phrase of humanity as "beings-in-time". This "creative" potential of humanity takes on increased importance in Huebner's quest for a new curricular language.

Through this creative capacity humanity makes present the past and future in time. The future possible is actualized in the present on the basis of the past. Such creative involvement in the present is a freeing activity. This freeing act, an act of creativity, could be described as man presenting himself to himself as the being in time. We could call it "presenting". Huebner, borrowing from Heidegger, describes this act as follows:

The present is the moment of vision when Dasein, finding himself thrown into a situation (the past), projects his own potentiality for being. Human life is not futural; nor is it past, but, rather, a present made up of a past and future brought into the moment. (Huebner, 1967b, p. 244)

The influence of this necessity-freedom pattern to Huebner's reflections is quite obvious in Huebner's approach to language. On the one hand, we have the language of the empirical, a confining language filled with conventional wisdom; it is a conditioned language but it is the language of necessity. On the other hand we have the language of possibility and potential, a language filled with mystery and doubt, a poetic language able to capture the awe of the unknown. And again, the first realm of language confines humanity; the second, the unrealmed, frees humanity. Between the poles of necessity and freedom, between continuity and discontinuity, between the conditioned and unconditioned is tension or conflict. This conflict is a result of a dialectical tension which is basic to existence. It is the paradox of existence which may not be questioned. By acting creatively this tension is made manifest. "This tension is a consequence of the struggle between the new and the old, between re-creation and preservation or conservation" (Huebner, 1975a, p. 29).

Huebner accepts, in principle, that this tension--the "conflict between the established and the emergent"--cannot be resolved, for in attempts to resolve it a new

manifestation of the tension occurs (Huebner, 1975a, p. 30). This tension, therefore, is structurally basic to Huebner's understanding of humanity. Human nature, in both an individual and collective sense, participates in this inexorable tension. Huebner summarizes the dialectical character of this tension as follows:

The tension between the new, manifest in the lives of the young, and the old, manifest in the already established, is a basic human tension. It exists because men, women, and children do not have a nature. They have only a past and a future which collide in the present. The consequences of that collision are limited by the way power is distributed, exercised in human relationships, and controlled by custom and law. (Huebner, 1975a, p. 31)

This basic human tension, therefore, can never be reduced, for, according to Huebner, it is the fundamental paradox of human existence which must be accepted. The interpolar interaction between the world of technique and the world of man's spirit collides in constant conflict. All that humanity can do is to engage in the fray and see that the power is shared equally, and it ought to provided that the world of man's spirit is uppermost. This concern with the way power is distributed is, of course, one of the guiding interests in Huebner's discussions of politics and power. In his work related to developing his CLD model, this political interest is somewhat muted. In his works of the seventies, however, this concern resurfaces and leads him to engage in more pronounced social critique.

In my review of Huebner's earlier works, I took note

of the key role which power and conflict played in relationship to symbol systems. Central to the ideological struggle of competing educational elites was the degree of political influence which ensued. Competing educational elites manifest their ideological interests not only in the actual political actions they undertake, but also in their control of the symbol sphere. Huebner's interest in this latter aspect is significant for this becomes the crossroad which leads to the development of his CLD model. The model attempts not only to reveal the various value systems, but also to disclose the systems of rationalization and legitimation occurring at the level of symbol formation--not necessarily at the level of classroom activity. Huebner's later renewed and more pronounced interests in the political, is perhaps concerned more with the dialectic between the individual and society rather than on the form of particular discourse systems (Huebner, 1975c, 1976, 1977a). Huebner summarizes this as follows:

But the distribution of possibility is also a matter of power and control, and consequently, law. Possibility does not reside within the neurological structure of the individual. It exists at the boundary between the individual and the lifestyle that have been forged by all our predecessors and left in the tools, images, habits, institutions, memories, and visions embodied in the public world. This is the public wealth--just as the resources of the earth are public wealth, even though controlled by limited interest groups. (Huebner, 1975a, p. 37)

Huebner's concern with the public wealth is two pronged: "concern for the possibilities of the individual" must be an "equal concern for the social-political-economic

conditions" (Huebner; 1975a, p. 37). Interest groups compete, then, as to the direction of distribution of this public wealth. This political interest, however, continues to be closely linked to his concern with the emergence of humanity in a spirit-oriented manner.

What, then, does Huebner judge to be the root difference between these various interest groups? Is it fair to characterize it as a struggle of disciplines--humanities and arts vs. sciences? Is it simply a conflict between a science oriented ideology and a humanities oriented ideology? Huebner seems to choose deliberately to counteract the dominance of the science ideology. In shaping his CLD model I noted that the humanity oriented concerns are not simply juxtaposed to the science oriented concerns; rather the humanity orientation is clearly valued at the top of a hierarchical ordering. But is Huebner simply characterizing the conflict in the curriculum field in terms of some fundamental tension between the humanities and the sciences? Is this fundamental tension intrinsically rooted in the presumed nature of the disciplines in terms of various forms of knowing having various forms of valuing? Do these forms of valuing differ, therefore, only in terms of epistemological considerations? If not, then what is the nature of the tension between these orientations? The nature of these tensions and the framework which seems to create them lies much deeper than that. It seems to originate from Huebner's own peculiar way of

viewing the world through the lenses of the necessity--freedom motif. And this bi-focal framework, the necessity-freedom motif, guides the direction of his criticisms and the direction of his new searches.

Underlying Huebner's criticism of objectives, therefore, is the fundamental assumption on his part that any striving toward a goal or purpose involves a form of determinism. Acceptance of objectives as a keynote to educational purpose is tantamount to acceptance of the world of technique, or of necessity. The human spirit is subject to the self-augmenting world of technique. But, according to Huebner, this continuous world of technique characterizes only half of man's nature and projects this as the fullness of man, thereby, tending to portray man's temporality as free. Correlative to this world of technique, however, is the world of spirit and of discontinuity. By acceptance of this infinite potential of humanity we come to recognize that which is essential for humanity --capacity for continual change. This capacity for continual change exemplifies the human spirit. If people fail to accept their essential nature as beings-in-time rather than in space then they eventually will be subsumed into the static order of necessity. Humanity must be understood, therefore, as essentially having an indeterminate being. It is this side of humanity's beingness, this creative potential marked by indeterminateness, that exemplifies the potential for humanity to be

continually free. "To be a man is to be capable of finite change and evolution until death. . . . A living man may always become something else; if he doesn't of his own accord, the world may push him to it" (Huebner, 1966e, p. 99).

These rather complex and interwoven notions of continuity and discontinuity, of necessity and freedom, of permanency and change, Huebner relates to the groundwork of curriculum. A somewhat lengthy quotation reveals the complex intertwinement of these various motifs.

It seems that this awareness of the significance of change deals the death blow to the concept of learning as central in curriculum thought. It is still necessary, for it is an instrumental category for fabricating an educational environment. But I do not believe that it can continue to be the central category of curriculum thought. Learning is an attachment, a fixation, a state of conditionedness; while man's essence is given by the antinomies of attachment and detachment, fixation and freedom, conditionedness and unconditionedness. Learning implies a determining of behavior, while man's reactions in the world are partially indeterminate. Learning implies a destination, whereas living as a man implies a destiny. In some ways the discussions about creativity a few years ago pointed to this conflict, for the educator, between the determinateness of learned behavior and the freedom essential for creative behavior. And, of course, one is not possible without the other. But when learning remains the central concept in curriculum, we tend to focus on one side of man's ambiguous situation in this world. (Huebner, 1966b, p. 99)

The foregoing review of the necessity-freedom motif in Huebner's works, I am arguing then, has implications for the way in which his curricular language model is to be interpreted. Although the necessity-freedom motif is dialectically conceived, the scheme also creates a

continuing thread of disjunction in Huebner's work (which has far reaching implications). In one sense, it sets up a two-valued thought pattern which shapes Huebner's entire way of understanding curriculum. This two-value framework tends to form a methodological framework by which Huebner interprets, describes, and explains all that occurs in educational endeavors. This methodological framework, therefore, locks Huebner's own language into a form which he never breaks out of. Yet, by having disclosed this framework we are able to enter interpretively into the ways in which Huebner aspires to revitalize the curricular field and to change curricular language. This fixed necessity-freedom scheme allows us to follow not only the inner character of Huebner's writings as a whole, but also to understand the contours of his curricular language disclosure model.

Learning versus Symbolic Transformation

To further disclose some of the contextual contours and dynamics to Huebner's CLD model I will attend to a second major motif in Huebner's curricular writings, a motif which is intimately related to the first motif of necessity and freedom. This second motif serves as a central dynamic to Huebner's idea of a curricular language and is involved with the tension created by the necessity-freedom motif. In Huebner's (1962, 1963a) early works the concept of learning received little criticism. The first overt critical reaction with supporting comments

occurs in "Politics and Curriculum" (Huebner, 1964a, p. 127). Here Huebner suggests that educational theory is unable to provide educators with directives for shaping classroom action because

the dependency upon an economic model and a learning technology has all but destroyed imaginative formulation of significant questions. . . . The educator does need clear and valid directives, but a means-ends model and a psychology of learning are not the only vehicles for identifying these directives. (p. 127)

Theories of learning, Huebner states, are limited for identifying educational directives because they are destructive of "imaginative formulation of significant questions".

For significant change to occur in educational activities, Huebner implies that the change must be generated at the symbolic level. At this level the existing forms of an ideology (symbol system) may be broken and created anew. New directions emerge in such disestablishment. Early on in his writings, we must remember, Huebner (1963a, p. 157) identified three levels where conversation may be impeded through various social encounters. The first level includes "the pattern of behavioral acts", the second includes "the values which are assumed to determine the behavioral acts", and at the third level "are the thought patterns or, preferably, the language or symbol systems which determine man's grasping and shaping of his world" (p. 157). This third level Huebner identifies as the most important level for it is prior to the level of

valuing; it "shapes values and legitimizes actions". In essence, it is the level of ideology. Disestablishment of this level may allow new forms to be created or imaginative speech to emerge. What this level of symbols contains is hinted at by Huebner in the following:

The way that man explains the world--his world hypotheses, images, conceptions or myths--are the vehicles by which he shapes values and legitimizes actions. (1963a, p. 157)

Conversation, for Huebner, is the major symbolic form with which humanity shares his world hypotheses, but barriers have come to block true conversation from occurring. Chief among these barriers is the psychological and sociological languages concerned with learning and objectives. Huebner wants "greater variability in symbolizing man's encounters with his fellowman" (1963a, pp. 153, 154).

To do that, he desires to limit the scientific modes of discourse which have become conventionalized as the mode of conversing. In his initial works we saw how he embarked on an exploration of other sources which might reveal new possibilities for conversation. From these sources (philosophy, theology, existential psychology and humanistic literature) Huebner uncovers those aspects which he considers indispensable to true conversations.

In his description of the various ways in which man encounters fellow man, Huebner (1963a) begins to link various forms of conversation to various forms of

encounter. For example, the instrumental forms of encounter are characterized by a functional economic language. This instrumental language, in shaping the values and legitimizing behavior, includes conversation which is valued merely for the goal it is intended to perform. This way of conversing has very limited powers for symbolizing man's existence.

Huebner, in his first discussion of language, chose deliberately the term "conversation" over "communication" because he judged the latter to be too transactionally oriented or instrumental. It implies, he claims, "only the transfer of information from one to another". The term conversation, however, comports well with the notion of "symbolic transformation", a term which he derives from Susanne Langer, and one which emphasizes "that language, indeed any symbol system, is essentially a symbolic transformation of experience" (Huebner, 1963a, p. 150).¹⁰

This root notion of transformation of experience becomes fundamental to Huebner's concern with reshaping and revitalizing curricular language. Huebner substitutes "symbolic transformation" in place of the psychologically rooted term "learning". This new term carries with it the presupposition that responsibility is intrinsic to transformation; that is, true conversation, to be transformative, is rooted in transcendent openness to the other. In true conversation a transformation of both speaker

and listener will occur if the conversing act is characterized by openness.

Conversation, then, involves a transforming of experience which grants each participant the possibility to build "his unique world out of his experience" (paraphrase, p. 151). The term conversation, for Huebner, suggests that the recipient (listener) act on the information received in such a way that the transformation allows new "beingness" to emerge (1963a, cf. p. 148). Such an act of transformation must be grounded as an ethical act; that is, it must occur within the context of the openness which only a transcendent encounter allows. Such a transformation, ethically grounded, is characterized by love and openness to the other. When this is at the heart of the creative conversation, the possibility of revitalizing life exists. Huebner portrays the importance of this notion of conversation as follows:

Conversation is thus an art. Not only an art of language, by which man finds new, aesthetically satisfying language forms and symbolizes the experience of his world; but also an art which leads to the forming of oneself and the other It is this which man needs today--to be able to accept that in conversation as a form of human encounter reality is found, solitude transcended, and life shaped. (1963a, p. 152, emphasis mine)

Linked to this emphasis on conversation as transformation of being is Huebner's concern with power and influence. Educational influence [power] is a condition of the educational act. And this act is not merely a communicative act which involves passing on bits of information

to be assimilated somehow through a technical process called learning. Huebner argues that in the responsible encounter one must seek to converse before ignoring, controlling, or using the other (1963a, p. 153). Acts of domination, submission or denial are not appropriate to responsible pedagogy. Conversation, therefore, must be "transcendently open" in order to circumvent power abuse. Huebner submits, however, that "superior power is not overcome by conversation, but when conversation is not accepted as a significant, indeed primary, form of encounter, then the use of power may predominate" (p. 153).

The key requirement in conversing, which allows transformation of experience to come about, is that of openness--openness grounded in the ability to respond, or "response-ability" as Huebner terms it. Such conversing is not instrumental; neither is it supported by a goal-oriented, need-directed learning theory. One could say that the encounter must be qualified by vulnerability, and by non-judgment. Huebner characterizes these qualities as follows:

He must be open to the speaker; the speaker senses this openness as an invitation to forsake his cliches, to expose his thoughts, to probe his own unformed notions, and to shape them so that he too gains new insights and satisfaction from the poetic form which they might take. (p. 149)

Conversation's potential, then, is tied intimately to the basic human capacity to symbolize. This creative

capacity, the force of imagination which empowers conversation toward free forms, is fundamental to Huebner's understanding of conversation as a transformational encountering of fellow humans. This notion of symbolic transformation plays a key role in place of the postulated concept of "learning". His earlier explorations of forms of encountering begins to emerge with each having an attendant symbolization system. Huebner, then, begins to mark off the limits of each of these language systems and develops a key cluster of meanings for each one.

Through confrontation of man with man, symbolic meanings are objectified. Speech becomes the primary form in which man's temporality (emergent being) is made manifest. By participating in the manifestations, new transformed manifestations emerge. Thus conversation is perhaps the most significant way for individuals to participate in the "continual creation and re-creation of man-in-the-world" (1967b, p. 245). But because man is inescapably in the world with fellow beings, the meanings of language systems are intimately intertwined with interpersonal modes of relating. Later Huebner (1977a) conceives of these modes of relating and conversing as being in dialectical tension. "The springs or sources of temporality do not reside in the individual, but in confrontation between the individual and other individuals, other material objects, and other ways of thinking as they are objectified in symbol and operation" (p. 245).

Meanings, then, objectified in the interpersonal modes of relating, give rise to attendant forms of conversing possible among people. The ultimate form of encounter, with its particular form of conversing, is the transcendent mode of being. Here Huebner seems to move beyond the idea of linguistic intersubjectivity to appeal to a fundamental spiritual communion which exists among man. In a more recent unpublished work "An Educator's Perspective on Language About God", (Huebner, 1977b) he states that

[speech is] . . . grounded in the biological scheme of social relations and . . . the nature of speech is not simply a function of the nature of language but of the diverse schemes of social relations that the neophyte established with people who make up her social environment. (1977b, p. 7)

The individual, therefore, as part of the community, is caught up in the dialectics of necessary conflict and confrontation but as a transcendent being is able to raise a free, spirit-oriented language. Huebner captures the sense of this in the following.

Language is dependent on socially shared usages and on an acceptance of common, objective categories projected into the world; but if accepted blindly, if the user reifies the concept, then language obscures the world rather than opens it. The language of conversation is not simply a recitation of the already known, but "a pathway to the realization of ourselves". (Huebner, 1974a, p. 150)

But what if an individual's new poetic utterances are not realized within a community? What if they are not accepted as common? The issue of the individual's creative language being socially valued in order for the "recreated" to become the established does not seem to

be adequately addressed by Huebner. It does, however, raise again the notion of power and influence.

Yet the question may be asked as to how or why certain selections of the cultural wealth are to be judged as educationally worthy. Huebner's views of curriculum's essential concern as "valued educational activity" would lend support to the need for such judgments as to how social sanction comes about. Although he suggests that it is possible for classroom meanings to exhibit five identifiable frameworks of value: technical, political, scientific, aesthetic, and ethical, he notably puts forward the frameworks of aesthetic valuing and ethical valuing as having more merit. He deems them to be intrinsically more valuable.

With this approach to curricular language Huebner aspires to provide pedagogical inquiry with a new directional framework for inquiry. The concepts of "learning" and "purpose" Huebner radically rejects and repeatedly criticizes. In jettisoning these notions Huebner begins to search for new forms, which he intimates must be filled with possibility and potential for revitalizing the existing locked-in-forms that have been generated by a technical rationality. Huebner, in his search for alternative forms, rejects the possibility of positing a long sought for learning theory of theories; rather he directs us to see how language--imaginatively formulated--is central to his alternative direction.

Early on in his search, Huebner's interests turned to human symbol systems. In his specific quest he sought to unite the realm of symbolic forms with the world of everyday educational activity. How do decisions relate to action? Who sanctions the decisions? Huebner's curricular language disclosure model seemingly arose from his search to find ways of describing the interconnection between symbol systems and classroom realities in a dynamic critical way. Earlier we took note of the five specific forms of valuing which Huebner identified. But the pattern which he provides also raises questions. What shape does his new language for curriculum take? And, is Huebner's search itself shaped by its own peculiar selection of meanings? What essential meanings for a redirected pedagogy does Huebner in fact offer for the curriculum endeavor?

Initially the meanings Huebner explores seem to be related to various ways of knowing. The question as to what it is that is at the heart of educational reality is responded to by Huebner as if it is a new epistemology that is needed in the curriculum field--an epistemology that goes beyond traditional learning theory and "scientific" knowing.

One can speculate whether Huebner accepts that he can understand each elite power group and other limited interest groups through the disclosure of their symbol systems. Or, one can speculate whether Huebner searches

for a unifying ground for the various disciplines related to various ways of knowing and various ways of conversing. Bellack (1964) raises some questions which perhaps relate to the context of Huebner's own inquiry. Bellack states:

It seems reasonable to inquire first of all if human knowledge in its many dimensions forms a recognized unity within which the field of inquiry and creativity fall neatly into place. Is there a sense in which all knowledge is one, with the arts and the sciences having a place in a unity of fundamental principles or basic methods of inquiry? . . . There seems to be little warrant for assuming that there is one over-arching method sufficiently flexible and inclusive to deal with problems in the scientific fields, to say nothing of the arts, crafts and applied areas. (p. 33)

Bellack, in holding that there is no one sufficient method of inquiry for all the fields of human knowledge challenges the curriculum worker to accept this fact and to acknowledge it in curriculum building. He argues:

The heterogeneous character of the intellectual resources that are a part of the culture is a fact of major significance for the curriculum builder. We would do well frankly to recognize this and make a place in our programs for the variety of logical orders that characterize the fields of knowledge on which we draw in building the curriculum. (p. 33)

Huebner's model, in certain respects, does account for the heterogeneous character of various sources for the curriculum but does not tie these specifically to the notion of multiple disciplines. His main concern is with the over dependency on the language of science. One could question, perhaps, whether his radical rejection of the sociological and psychological languages is in fact a rejection of these disciplines. The overvaluing of their

scientific-technical language, he claims, "has led to an undervaluing of religious and aesthetic language" (p. 159). To counter-balance this undervaluing he deliberately chooses to vouch for an increase in an aesthetic-ethical language orientation rather than a scientific orientation. He states,

Without question, scientific language is the language for generalization, prediction and control. But it is not the scientist who creates values--it is the artist. (emphasis mine; Huebner, 1963a, p. 159)

In addition to being the creator of values Huebner gives the artist a pronounced image. At one point he claims, "In the sphere of man's relationship to man, the artist might be considered the prophet or the saint" (1963a).

Huebner struggles with and calls into question the nature of scientific knowledge, a knowledge form which roots itself in explication of an external reality. Scientific language systems, for Huebner, are concerned with objects, with systematic revealing of knowables and predictable qualities about objects in order to control them. Scientific language, therefore, is cast into a subject-object mode unlike the language of the poet or theologian who meets the "other" face-to-face in a subject-to-subject encounter (I - it; I - Thou; Martin Buber, 1955). Huebner's quest, therefore, shifts from notions of epistemic pluralism to interests in the ways in which knowledge is socially constituted. In addition, we could

say that he moves from an interest in ways of knowing to an interest in ways of being. And yet this shift is not characterized by a radical departure from one interest to another; rather the two interests are fused.

His shift to socially realized forms of understanding, however, raises the question whether education is first and foremost an examination of cultural forms rather than an examination of supposed natural forms. Huebner's interest in socially constituted forms seems to indicate his preference for interpreting and understanding educational meaning as cultural forms. Some forms, especially scientific and technical ones, have come to dominate.

Huebner's shift of interest from ways of knowing to ways of being suggests a deeper presuppositional framework to his curricular language disclosure model. In developing the notion of symbolic formation in place of the postulated concept of learning, Huebner tends to give special credence to the notion of change as crucial to symbol formation. The significance of change is highlighted by emphasizing form giving as requiring transformation. Meanings are shaped in unique ways through transformation of the old into new creations. Borrowing from existential theology and philosophy Huebner links responsibility, transcendence, freedom, promise, forgiveness, openness, and doubt to this key act of symbolic transformation. This web of crucial meanings, he suggests, is hinged to modes of being, not to modes of knowing.

Being in relationship to others involves various ways of encountering others through conversation. The most important form of encounter is that which emerges through transcendent conversing. Transcendent conversing is rooted in humans being able to respond to each other in openness--facing each other with forgiveness and promise and arising above the realm of necessity. The determination of humanness (beingness), therefore, is encapsulated in this notion of responsible symbolical transformation which occurs through ways of encountering and conversing. This notion of human existence is not concerned with the subjective limitations to various forms of human knowing; rather, Huebner is presupposing a core notion of transcendent encounter which goes beyond knowledge forms, for it involves forms of transcendent understanding which are ethically and aesthetically qualified. We could term this a spiritual view of humanity.

The revitalization attempts by Huebner, therefore, emerge more as a revolution in understanding than as a reformation of knowledge forms. The life-blood of pedagogy is taken to be the human potential to symbolically transform humanity beyond the existing forms of humanness. This transformation of humanity, Huebner suggests, is not simply a recreation of external knowledge forms but involves a continued re-creation of humanity.

Chapter VI: Reflections on the Aesthetic-Ethical

In the preceding few chapters, I described at length the general contours of Huebner's CLD model. I provided specific descriptions of important aspects of that model and I extrapolated on some of the fundamental motifs underlying that model, namely, the freedom-necessity motif and the learning versus symbolic transformation motif. In reflecting on these, it became obvious to me that there are certain lines of dependency between what Huebner takes to be various modes of relating (or being) and various forms of conversation. It is also obvious that Huebner directs us toward two of the five value systems included in his CLD model--the aesthetic and the ethical. In this chapter, I will attend more closely to these two value systems by exploring some of the meanings attached to each and by critiquing some of these. I will begin by focusing on what Huebner says about the aesthetic.

The Aesthetic Reconsidered

Educational activity, when valued aesthetically, is viewed by Huebner (1965a) as having three dimensions: psychical distance, wholeness and design, and symbolic meaning. Related to these are the serviceable concepts of an aesthetic rationality which include the continual caging of chaos, psychical distance or non-instrumentality, beauty or harmony and form, truth as unveiled meaning, and criticism.

Huebner's rendering of the aesthetic value system

and aesthetic rationality depicts teachers and students as both creators and critics of educational activities. Both product and activity receive attention. The activities, once created, are to be viewed for their wholeness and design in detachment from their utility. Essentially, they are to be viewed as objects for aesthetic contemplation which render beauty and truth. The fundamental viewpoint adopted by Huebner is that of Paul Valery. "The most evident characteristic of a work of art," claims Valery, "is its uselessness" (Valery, 1964). Educational activities, therefore, taken as artefacts of artistic creation, are symbols with aesthetic dimensions detached from the world of use (Cf. Huebner, 1966b, p. 107). Those aspects which render beauty (wholeness, design, harmony, and balance) are the fundamental aspects to be noted from this detached stance. In treating the activities this way, as a symbolic form, truth may be unveiled. Huebner describes this latter aesthetic dimension as follows.

Likewise, separated from use, the object, structure, or activity becomes symbolic of the artist-creator and indeed of man and society. Symbolically it has the potential for truth in that it symbolizes the feelings, awareness, visions and possibilities of the artist and his world. Educational activity and the environment in which it occurs may be valued for its beauty and truth. (Huebner, 1966b, p. 108)

As conceived here, the artistic symbol, or artefact, mediates between the artist and audience. Valued for its beauty and truth, it reflects humanity's capacity for transcendence. But, we may inquire, what is it that

is vital to this aesthetic stance which Huebner adopts?

Huebner regards one of the prime aesthetic values to be the way in which we go about our experiencing of the artistic symbol. Our aesthetic stance must include psychical distance. The artefact (educational activity or artistic symbol) must be seen as detached from the world of use. Our grasp of the symbol must take seriously its non-instrumentality. What we have, then, is a pre-requisite approach to the symbol.

This approach or aesthetic stance assumedly is that of the critic as spectator. Aesthetic valuing is rooted in this stance--a stance of contemplation. This peculiar orientation, however, does not seem to be consistent with Huebner's interests in political influence and in social meanings. The implicit direction to the aesthetic stance is not on the work or action of the educational activity, nor on its consequences. The emphasis of this stance is on the spectator's or critic's actions, their aesthetic experience, their act of contemplation as distanced from the activity. It is assumed that somehow the symbolic transformation of the artist's creativity alone escapes the clutches of social realities. It is the artist who supposedly excels in the invention of new symbolic forms. As mentioned, this view of the aesthetic does not fit well with Huebner's political interests. It is, however, compatible with the notion of symbolic transformation which he adopts from Suzanne Langer. For Langer, symbol

reception is regarded as involving an action performed upon experienced reality. In the aesthetic experience, viewed as an act of contemplation, some silent transformation of inner and outer world, artist and world, occurs. In this experience humanity's responses go beyond the ordinary to that of "sustained attention" at the "unbridled chaos" unveiled yet captured momentarily within the aesthetic forms.

To arrive at this level of contemplation--"truth as life to be unveiled"--a choice must be made as to appropriate forms. And the language most serviceable for rendering life as unveiled truth, the ultimate form of symbol formation, is that of poetics. Poetics is in a sense set forth as a transcendent way of making sense of reality, a way of making sense in non-conceptualized manners, a form that transcends thinking. In noting this we must remember Huebner's claim that "No language system is so good or significant that other language systems cannot eventually take its place--unless it is an aesthetic form But an aesthetic form has no instrumental value" (1965a, p. 220).

Aesthetic forms, valued non-instrumentally, are primarily important not as artefact or object of artistic creation, but as catalysts for response qualified as awe-filled. Huebner terms this mode of response as bringing about "sustained attention" and "perpetual desire". In order for aesthetic forms to render such response, the

prerequisites are those of beauty and truth.

Huebner, as a rule, links the term beauty to the aesthetic value system, but truth seems to be associated closely with the "response-ability" of the ethical value system. His coupling of the terms beauty and truth generally indicates that our response to the artistic symbol (educational activities as objects for aesthetic contemplation) is essentially an aesthetic-ethical response because not only is a symbolic form created but humanity's meanings are projected. Humanity's ability to respond in freedom from the realm of necessity is fully realized. Symbolizing feelings, awareness, visions, and possibilities are always to be understood then as an aesthetic-ethical meaning-creating act whereby humanity manifests self and world.

Beauty, as described in the aesthetic rationality would seem to be primarily a consideration for form, or a peculiar harmony in the wholeness and design of an activity. But Huebner intends for beauty to be closely linked to what humanity is, not to what humanity's symbols are. In discussing curricular leadership Huebner says:

Aesthetic responsibility for the design of meaningful education environments requires a sensitivity to truth and beauty. That which is created reflects man; and it must be a truthful reflection of what man is. . . . Beauty can be considered the disclosure of possibility, the bringing into awareness of the perfectibility of man, and perhaps even the exposure of his potential for tragedy and comedy. (Huebner, 1966e, p. 149)

Beauty, then, in being closely allied to truth, is a concern with man's possibility and perfectability. If beauty were a peculiar harmony in the wholeness and design of an educational activity then it would seem possible that we could, in observing what we take to be beautiful educational activities, point out to one another some of the typical structures of the activity which contribute to this peculiar harmony. This does not seem to be allowable in Huebner's approach to the aesthetic. Beauty seems to be more an experience of the educational activity; it relates to aspects of our contemplation, our inner sensitivities of peacefulness, awe, harmony, possibility, and the like. Again, what is of most importance then is the experience of the educational activity as artistic artefact, an experience which is to be taken as virtual life.

This particular way which Huebner has of understanding the aesthetic aspects to existence raises some difficulties. To begin with it seems to bypass the significance of artistic creation itself. He assumes that the predominant value of the aesthetic is the contemplative experience which it renders for the critic. By taking this stance toward the aesthetic the importance of the artist in the act of creating is hidden. But even more problematic is the fact that this stance intrinsically has to deny the social uses to which people put artefacts of art (or educational activities). The uses or actions

to which artefacts (educational activities) are put as instruments and objects in the social world must be dispensed with. I would believe, however, that this non-instrumentalist aesthetic stance of Huebner's already contains culturally embedded social values toward aesthetic objects--a social value linked to notions of "high art" held by the cultural and intellectual elite.

Huebner, with this aesthetic stance, is caught, therefore, in a basic tension. His interests and considerations related to political influence in the press of social circumstance must be suspended or deflected as inoperative in the aesthetic dimensions of living. His attitude in the aesthetic must be one of awe. And as to the actions of teachers and students engaging in educational activities, human agency in creating those activities is not central, for the main attention of the aesthetic rationality must be on the awe inspired response to the unformed forming. The aesthetic rationality, thus conceived, seems to link experiencing more to a mode of consciousness in the beholder than to a mode of creating or acting by the creator. And fundamentally it seems bent on denying that such modes of consciousness (experiencing) have any link to social contexts. Aesthetic significance, then, for Huebner's CLD model, ultimately lies not in the creative act, nor in the objects rendered by the creative action of the artist; rather, the significance lies in the potential for beauty and truth. These, being symbolic of man's

possibilities and perfectability, are grasped through the experience of aesthetic contemplation.

In reviewing briefly one of Huebner's other works we can see that he does not totally deny the artistic creative side of the aesthetic; he does, however, subordinate it to the experience of contemplation. "Today's Challenges" (Huebner, 1967a), written shortly after "Curricular Language and Classroom Meanings" (1965a), challenges teachers "to dare to create classroom situations which are significant aesthetic expressions of our individuality" (Huebner, 1967a, p. 256). He claims at one point that "the teacher's task is to scrutinize this mass of people, feelings, things, ideas and demands and to foresee what it can become. He has to transform the everything into a valued something before it becomes a wasted nothing" (p. 256, emphasis Huebner's). In bringing about this transformation of "everything" to a "valued something" Huebner describes how the teacher needs the qualities of the artist.

The teacher must be able to live with and in the intricacies, absurdities and dissonances without seeking to reduce them to neat formulae and dead routines. He needs the qualities of the artist, for art can deal with life in its fullness and emptiness, its beauty and ugliness. Art can bring together the conflicts, the opposites, and make sense out of them. The function of art is to project meaning and sense into a world that at times seems meaningless and senseless--to create value where it is non-existent. This is why teaching is an art and why teaching becomes an expression of the teacher and his feelings. Teaching is that creative act whereby the teacher takes everything under his control (and many things not under his control) and somehow molds them

and shapes them until the chaos is subdued and, lo and behold, there is something that makes sense. In the hands of a real artist, teaching has form and balance and rhythm which unite everything into something of beauty. Those who participate or observe go away feeling the truth of "Yes, that is what life can be all about if someone really cares and creates with sensitivity and skill." (pp. 256, 257)

Here, too, the "somehow" which molds, shapes, and subdues the chaos, the "somehow" which "unites everything into something", is not that which is important; what is important is the "something" that makes sense so that it may be responded to. The expressions of the teachers feelings, the symbolic form which has come into existence, allows us to "go away feeling the truth of . . . what life can be all about." Huebner clearly mentions the participation by teachers and students; yet the importance of participation is tied to the processes of observing the "expressions" of the teacher. Participation here is similar perhaps to vicarious experience in drama.

But what is this aesthetic response that is called for? Is it first rendered by doing something or by performing some form of action on the artefacts of expression? Or is it some state of being attained through some silent transformation of experience which unites chaotic unconditioned reality with sensible forms appropriate for human expression? The latter seems to be close to what Huebner holds to. Thus, the teaching act, aesthetically-ethically qualified, is a transforming act which renders chaos into sensible form, uniting both past and future into the

present; it unites individual existence and social existence through the mediation of symbolic projections. The world of the unconditioned, existing prior to experience, is not known, but by being receptive and open, this world of the unconditioned is united with our conditionedness and new forms are brought into our awareness to which we respond with awe and mute attention.

The creative actions, or those attributes of educational activities which initiate this transformation of the unformed into the formed, remain vague. Are there any particular instrumental properties inherent to certain educational activities (observed as artefacts of artistic creation) which would qualify them over other inferior activities as better stepping stones for this action of transformation? The qualities of wholeness and design, the lenders of harmony, must be attributable to some arrangements of elements in the activity. And in making descriptions of these would we not also need to make some claims as to the contents of that activity? But the nature of the activities is rarely spoken of by Huebner. Symbolic formation and critical responding are his crucial concerns, for it is the transformational potential of these which best reflects humanity's spirit--not humanity's nature.

To be reflective of man's spirit, however, there seems to be a necessary dependency on the foresight and the vision of the creator. Huebner mentions this requirement in the following.

He [the curricular leader] makes this transformation from givens and limitations through the quality of his educational vision. Educational conditions are incarnate educational possibilities, sometimes hidden from view, but awaiting the creative touch of the visionary who can imagine the possibilities coming to life in appropriate contexts [beauty and truth emerging]. The designed educational environment is a fusion of given conditions and vision--it is the creation of meaning. (Huebner, 1970a, p. 149)

The quality of that educational vision, as I have before described, is essentially qualified as aesthetic-ethical. This aesthetic-ethical meaning-creating act of transformation, a quality of vision which apparently cannot be acquired, Huebner posits as basic to humanity. A glimpse of it surfaces as follows:

Man is a transcendent being, i.e., he has the capacity to transcend what is to become something that he is not. In religious languages this is his nature, for he is a creator. . . . he participates in both the conditioned and unconditioned, or in necessity and freedom. Man is conditioned to the world; he participates in the world's structures of necessity. But given this patterning, fixation, and conditioning, he also participates in the unconditioned--in freedom, or (if you wish) in the continual creation of the world. (Huebner, 1967b, p. 241)

Humanity's creative capacity then is the capacity which leads toward freedom. As creators, people are able to transcend the conditioned structures of necessity. Their capacity to transcend, their "creativity", is not learned or acquired; it is part of humanity's essential nature. It may apparently be disciplined.

The driving force to the educational enterprise must be this creative and freedom-oriented capacity. The creation of meaning via this aesthetic-ethical meaning-creating

capacity is not to be denied, ignored, or taken for granted.

Meaning isn't something which simply exists within the world. It is man-made, reflecting what man is or what man makes himself to be. To ignore the creation of meaning is not simply to let natural meanings come to the fore, but to let meaning emerge out of the careless and routine activity of man. The educational environment has meaning; it is the significance of those people who have responsibility for it. (Huebner, 1970a, p. 149)

I do not wish to deny the worth of aesthetic contemplation. Educational activities, in my judgment, may from time to time serve as objects of aesthetic contemplation but this is likely not the most important role that such activities play in classrooms. Educational activities are not in general intended for aesthetic contemplation although there may well be aesthetic dimensions to them. Likewise, the work of teaching is not generally intended to serve as an object for aesthetic contemplation, although on odd occasions, using video tape technology, for example, it might well be. But even though it is rarely the intentions of educational activities to serve as objects for aesthetic contemplation, Huebner suggests that this in fact is one of the more valuable ways in which they could serve. I believe Huebner has unjustifiably given this action of aesthetic contemplation an elevated place within his CLD model simply because the framework in which he sets the model requires it to be so. The significance he attributes to the aesthetic dimensions hinges on the entire transcendent transformation notion of creativity,

which he holds will put us in touch with "essential reality".

One concession that Huebner apparently must make is that educational activity must serve as a ground for realizing the state of awe or perpetual desire. The educational activity must serve somehow as an instrument to bring about contemplation. It, therefore, functions in the performance of the action he terms mute response. This aesthetic-ethical meaning-creating act must somehow continually unify and recreate past and future meanings into the present from a stance of free design and unhindered choice. A free imagination surfaces as the key to creativity. Humanity's imaginative creative potential is that which must direct all symbolic form-making. This freedom-oriented status of the imagination requires further discussion.

Beauty and truth, possibility and perfectibility, transformation and transcendence, necessity and freedom--all of these--form a constellation of vital meanings to what I have termed an aesthetic-ethical meaning-creating act. This symbol-producing act is the core where some unitary synthesis and transformation of inner and outer world occurs, a place where personal and social planes of existence meet. That there is such a uniting function to the creation of symbolic forms is never questioned or denied by Huebner; it is accepted or posited as fundamental to being human. But this aesthetic-ethical notion seems

to call for more critical investigation, for somehow in the pattern to Huebner's thought this aesthetic-ethical meaning-creating act, or act-of-being, can never be enclosed in the symbolic form which emerges. It seems to be a directive agent behind or above the symbolic form but must itself remain as a free mode of being.

The dilemma is this. No sooner is the symbolic form set loose from the spontaneous free design of man, than it becomes part of the world of necessity. As part of the world of necessity it immediately must stand over against the world of freedom. Although all aesthetic-ethical meaning-creating acts must somehow continually unify, reabsorb, reshape, and recreate the world of necessity with that of the world of freedom, the new transformations, the new symbolic forms which emerge, must constantly be denied. This stance of denial, which is encapsulated in Huebner's notion of the faith-doubt dialectic, demands that there be ceaseless tension, conflict, and struggle.

The creative capacity of humanity--the imagination--seems, therefore, to have a presymbolic transcendent status. The exercising of the imagination must somehow secure unity for the diversified moments of experienced conditionedness (the past), the experiential (the present), and the not yet experienced (the future). Fundamentally, the imagination must be autonomous. The symbolic forms arising from the imagination's free design may never impose constancy on the chaos encountered; temporality must be

fully acknowledged. To "fix" the symbolic forms is to reify them. The synthesis by the imagination of the diversities of existence (past, present, and future) may only be momentarily "snared" in language.

As noted earlier, the results of the creative form-giving must be doubted constantly. Imaginative renderings may never be adapted to natural or social settings for then they would be encompassed in the world of technique. Also it was noted that Huebner's insistence on the non-instrumentality of aesthetic forms sets them forth as the exclusive forms for unveiling truth. Such a stance, I argued, denies the socially relevant context of valued educational activities. But the status which Huebner accords to the imagination is problematic in a more fundamental way.

The imagination plays a fundamental selecting role prior to the emergence of values and rationalization schemes. Free form-giving must be characterized by the inexplicable emergence of arbitrary forms which are unconditioned by existing values or meaning structures. The imagination, in giving form to experience, has to remain open to being's emergence. The transformational character of the imaginative venture may not be for or against that which it gives form to. Committedness in any direction is ruled out.

A major problem to Huebner's thought emerges here, one which is similar to the chief problem undergirding

rationalistic scientism; the problem relates to the issue of neutrality and objectivity. The approach of the imagination in the creation of freely designed symbolic forms must be an approach that never chooses a particular direction and yet must be an acceptance of directionlessness. The neutrality notion lingering here is perhaps a reappearance of the notion of value free inquiry under the guise of an autonomous imagination. The notion of openness and doubt which Huebner ties intimately to the work of symbolic transformation must be the hand-maiden of free design.

Imaginative searching must always be ready to doubt the efficacy of existing language, and must attempt to keep language supple, refreshed and alive. (p. 115)

Imaginative form-creation must retain an unhinged status to the realm of necessity. Furthermore, it supposedly must have an indeterminate influence in the creation of new forms. As the key controlling idea of humanity's essence, this imaginative capacity must allow transcendence of humanity's limitedness and finitude. Yet in the act of transcending, humanity can never get rid completely of that which is transcended. The appropriate attitude to be adopted is, therefore, one falling under the impulse of freedom and doubt, for only this attitude grants openness. Unfortunately, this attitude of openness receives no critical reflection in Huebner's writings.

Huebner holds that only imaginative searching, a mode peculiar to aesthetic ventures, can break the impetus

toward reification. Poetic oriented symbol systems rather than scientific oriented ones allow humanity to avoid reified constellations of meaning. With this poetic orientation the imaginative enterprise is sufficiently guided by doubt, whereas the scientific ventures, characteristically concerned with predictability and control, are guided by trust and certainty. For Huebner, doubt is linked to faith and openness, and to transcendent encounters. The dilemma emerging is as follows.

Humanity's responsiveness, whatever the project be, is manifested in action. It is through humanity's creative acting that life as truth emerges. This active response of humanity is grounded not in that which is doubted but in that which is trusted. Even though the resultant symbolic forms created in the acting must, according to Huebner, be of a transitory, dynamic form, those which at least for the moment are trusted are in fact the forms having the most significant bearing on humanity's emergence. In the educational enterprise these are the conditions that perform the educating, even if Huebner does not want to identify or describe active agents or ingredients of these conditions. At the level of action, doubt plays second fiddle to trust. A partial glimpse of this Huebner realizes in the following.

To be alive today is to be aware that man is cloaked in mystery and that we see through a glass darkly or through a cloud of unknowing. The only viable stance is to doubt what we think we know and feel, to question our deepest beliefs and our most habitual actions,

and yet to be able to act morally and with courage in the face of the unknown. (emphasis mine, Huebner, 1967a, p. 253)

Although our "only viable stance" may be one of doubt, our ability to act morally is of weightier significance.

In various situations educators are called to action. Certain situations perhaps impose demands for certain formative actions to intercede normatively. The educator is not given the option to disregard possible alternatives characterized by imaginative doubt; the educator must intercede normatively in the given circumstances and know what to do. Such active intervention is characterized more by an attitude of trust and committedness than by one of doubt.

Keeping this in mind, it would seem then that "valued educational activity", the prime category identified by Huebner for the curriculum worker, must ground judgments as to worth not only in the forms which are rendered by those activities, but also in the contents of those activities. Huebner, however, rarely indicates the contents of any activity--his concern is only with structure or forms and the direction implicit to the activities as being either oriented toward the world of spirit or the world of technique. But values, if ascribed to various discourse systems, are not rooted only in the language forms arising but in occasions in which such values are actualized. Bringing about concrete descriptions of these occasions of particular educational activities and

indicating the significance of particular exemplifications of values seems to be a needed prerequisite to judgments of worth and criticisms of the valued activity.

The Ethical Reconsidered

In general, ethics is regarded as a study of responsible action where practice and principles are in accord with what is considered "correct" conduct governing relationships (Stob, 1978). Ethics then is concerned with morality; with the judgments and actions of people toward one another as groups, and as individuals. Personal ethics is chiefly concerned with character formation. Interpersonal ethics deals with the way people respond to each other on a one-to-one basis. Social ethics focuses on the larger social dimension of human existence--on the moral significance of collectives or communities among themselves and in relationship to individuals (Stob, 1978).

Huebner's understanding of ethical values is rooted primarily in person-to-person encounters. The concern of this value category in his CLD model is on "the value of the educational act per se" (1965a, p. 227). The educator and the student confront each other directly as fellow beings. The essence of that human confrontation is "the brute fact that he [the educator] is but a man trying to influence another man [the student]" (1965a, p. 229).

But for Huebner, ethical influence is not related to formation of certain patterns of conduct or development

of particular virtues; it is related to all ways in which human responses are shaped and influenced. This broad sweep of ethical influence he captures under the term "response-ability". Any influencing of another's ability to respond becomes an ethical consideration. At root, then, Huebner sees educational influence as a moral act. The educator, as a being with power, dares to influence another. Education, as human activity, first and foremost involves the capacity to influence and the corresponding capacity to be influenced. In a later work, "Moral Values and the Curriculum", Huebner (1965b) expands on the responsibility which the educator has to legitimately influence the student. This responsibility "emerges from his love for the world, and his desire to share the world and its creation with the neophyte" (1965b p. 14). The educator humbly recognizes this power of mutual influence on "the basis of his power to create and his power to promise and forgive" (1965b, p. 15).

Very early in my reconstruction of the vital contextual meanings to Huebner's CLD model I took note of the importance which he attached to human encounters. His early imaging of these encounters identified five modes of relating: (1) instrumental non-social transactions, (2) encounters of denial, (3) encounters of submission, (4) encounters of domination, and (5) encounters of love characterized by openness and freedom (see figure 2). Only in the last mode of encounter does humanity begin

to realize freedom and accept one another fraternally. It seems that only in this latter stage of encounter are human responses free of self-interest, free of the mediating structures and agencies of society, free in a direct openness to the other. This mode of social encounter which humbly accepts the power to influence and create, and which also duly recognizes the power to promise and forgive is the only form of social encounter taken to be transcendent. The freedom of each in the encounter is maximized. Only in this mode can people rise above social circumstances.

This interpersonal framework of Huebner's early discussions of ethics, including his understandings as expressed in his curricular language disclosure model, is quite inadequate. The dominant pattern to the encounters described always assumes a dyadic form--one person encountering another. If even one of the participants in the encounter is open to the other, supposedly the relationship will be guided by transcendent considerations of openness and love. But this image for schooling is too simplistic; educational activity, in much of its present form, tends to be group activity. Being organized as such the relationship between the individual and the group, or, between the personal and social plane of existence, becomes far more complex than that of dyadic encounters. The very notion of conflict and influence involved is far more complex when the paradigm for discussion

involves social groups rather than one-to-one encounters.

In Huebner's later works he seems to shift away from a personal and interpersonal ethic to a more social-oriented ethics. He calls for creation of just educational environments (Huebner, 1974d, 1977a) and focuses most of his discussions of influence on the dynamics among the individual and various social groups. He feels that the works of Mann and Bowles and Gintis¹¹, have helped considerably in calling to our attention "the controlling functions inherent in institutionalized educational structures" (1977a, p. 92). Huebner's interests turn more to the micro structure--the interpersonal or intersubjective, the biography of the individual within specific social locations. In reviewing the work of Piaget, for example, Huebner suggests that Piaget's most important contribution is not his description of the cognitive functioning of the individual during different stages of growth, as many educators assume, but is rather his calling our attention to a different definition of knowledge structures--knowledge structures as evolving, as biographical or historical, and as dialectical (Huebner, 1977a p. 95).

He [Piaget] brings into our awareness the possibility that all adult forms of knowing and action can be, should be, seen in the perspective of their genesis in the person. No longer should we adults be permitted to see adult forms of knowledge or action as the way to interpret knowledge or action. Just as Marx required that we see them as social phenomena, and interpret them historically and dialectically, so Piaget asks that we now see them genetically (or

historically) and dialectically in the individual person. (1977a, p. 95)

The interests and concerns in Huebner's later works in fact seem to focus predominantly on the child-adult relationships with an equal concern on construction of just educational environments. This concern with child and adult relationships is still fundamentally a concern with ethical human encounters. It is still a concern with influence. The formation of human destiny, as one of the undeniabables of educational influence, must obviously place uppermost the crucial relationship of adult to child. Formative, nurturing intervention must be grounded in maximizing the ability to respond freely in the child.

The central strand of Huebner's ethical reflections continues to be upon the forms of influence. Educational activities constructed by the adult must be valued primarily on the basis of their ability to induce responsiveness. And since a child's responsiveness will inevitably be caught in the clutches of social expectation, the pedagogical relationship requires critical openness by the adult to the child's ways of responding in the world. At one point Huebner describes this requirement of responsiveness as follows:

The significant educational environment, one which seeks to influence the student's transcending of self, must offer the student promise that he can be renewed and remade or perhaps more appropriately unconditioned and reconditioned. (1965b, p. 15)

Pedagogical influence, therefore, is a concern with

"the finite mystery of the single individual" who is "yet to be conditioned" or, who is "over conditioned" (1965b). Part of the curriculum project, therefore, involves more attention to the life experiences of the child. Huebner calls for personal historical descriptiveness (i.e., biography) as a way to understand the actual experiences of children. Language, however, still holds an interest for Huebner. In his works of the early seventies he suggests how a child's experiences are very different from an adult's because of language differences. It could be said that children dwell in a different "house of language". And these language differences suggest a difference in the kind of experiences children have; they are not indicative of merely a difference in the degree of experience they have. For example, Huebner suggests that an adult oriented language interprets experience in terms of a time continuum whereas children have another way of confronting and experiencing temporality.

Language, or more specifically, conversation continues to emerge as an important adherent aspect to social encounters. Conversation continues to be depicted as an important link related to ethical influence. Huebner sums up the role of conversation in the pedagogue's task as follows:

The teacher, then, as a moral agent, arranges an environment with conditions which promise and forgive, and as an active agent he stands ready to do so personally. As a moral agent, however, the teacher's major activity is conversation: participating with the

students in the meeting ground of the conditioned and the unconditioned. Conversation means listening to another, taking into one's being what the other has said, and throwing something new out into the environment for the listener. It is more than communication, for it is not simply the exchange of information, but the transformation of feelings, sensations and awareness into new words or symbols and actions. (1965b, p. 16)

The importance of conversation as a transformation of experience relates again to Huebner's call for the poetic. In human encounter or in confrontation with reality in a direct awe-struck manner it is through conversation that humanity symbolically projects new humanity. Human conversation, Huebner claims, "is the unique moral response of man-to-man, for through conversation man can participate in the conditioned and the unconditioned" (1965b, p. 14). The teacher's task of influence essentially involves several modes of encounter.

A person wishing to influence another may do so then, by determining the conditions in the environment [technical-instrumental mastering], by being himself a conditioned being within the environment [in subjection to past] or by participating with the other in the ongoingness of life through conversation [transcendent encounters]. (inserts mine, 1965b, p. 14)

The key aspects of the educational project which Huebner identifies, therefore, are: language, human encounter, and awe or wonder at confronting the non-man-made world. These three aspects are the key manifestations of an ethical valuing for they alone "reflect man and his possibilities" (1966b, p. 107).

Viewing educational activity as having these

dimensions of influence is, for Huebner, to view it from the realm of humanity's spirit. To ask "What is to be learned?" or "What are the expected outcomes?" is to see it in a narrow technical managerial sense. Educational valuing of activities is not, therefore, a primary concern with specifying particular content in terms of the behavioral changes which such content might produce; educational valuing is first and foremost an influential encounter of teacher with student in a subject-to-subject sense.

Huebner abandons, therefore, the technical-scientific valuing of educational activity. He invites us to see education as fundamentally involving creation or transformation of personal destinies. The student as a fellow being-in-the-world projects new possibilities from within the action of transformation or recreation. The responsiveness to the human situation of influence must emphasize the self-construction of experience whereby the child chooses to fulfil his or her own destiny.

Huebner severely calls into question the educator's taken-for-granted ways of maintaining and perpetuating a certain type of society by imprinting children with the masked rules, roles, and expectations of society.

Socialization theorists believe that education must get children to adopt as their own the shared cognitive, emotional, and behavioral features of their society . . . [and] for children to internalize these shared social phenomena. (1977a, p. 104)

In such a view, the individual, as an inescapable member

of a given social community is dominated by and assimilated into the community. But the crucial mode of relating by the individual to the community must not be a total conforming to the community; the relationship must allow an openness and critical doubt so that the new meanings may be created and old ones be recreated. Human destiny is thereby transformed.

Increasingly, Huebner must deal with how the experiences of the individual child are part of the dynamics of the social group or community. He accepts that these two are always in conflict as personal destiny and social destiny struggle together. Ultimately he sees this conflict as a dialectic where mutual influence occurs. Conversation continues to be the most significant intermediary mode for shaping and for being shaped in this dialectic between the individual and the community. Huebner's call for justice is intertwined with his call to political action. There can be no justice without acceptance of political responsibility which ensures it. Justice is perfected when humanity acknowledges its responsibilities.

A responsible educational community, for Huebner, must strive for open and loving relationships. The responsible community is not a collection of individuals each pursuing his or her own self interests; a responsible community seeks justice. It is an ethical community where the public wealth and the interests of the individual

are shared in a way that each accepts the responsibility not only of personal destiny but of humanity's destiny.

Educational influence is not then the socialization of youth to fit the molds and cogs of society; rather, educational influence must be seen as inherently liberating for both the individual and for society. In "Poetry and Power", Huebner (1975b) sums it this way.

We are about the conscious shaping of the future by helping the young work out, work through, or work into their futures and into our future. Ours is . . . a power for individuals. And a power for the future of our public world. (1975b, p. 227)

In his later works then, Huebner sees himself as giving expression to, and reflecting on, a new liberating-orienting consciousness for directing educational influence. With this shift Huebner directs his call for freedom especially at social forms which restrict children. The individual is bound to the others, and is in a sense condemned to relate in one way or another. This basic bond Huebner sees as essential to humanness; not to accept it is to lose freedom in the pursuit of individualism. An individualistic notion of freedom, Huebner rejects. Language, however, remains the vital link in that basic bond.

In a later work Huebner, in fact, argues that "the forms of language usage are the coordinates of social relations, and . . . the clues to the possible schemata of these social relations are to be found in the functions of speech between and among persons in their many relations" (1977a, p. 103). In taking these language interests

into a stronger political vein, he calls for new directions of inquiry that will uncover shifts in the language due to shifts in the social relationships.

That which needs to be traced empirically and phenomenologically is the gradual transition from these social relations of care and communication to the relations of production. Furthermore . . . it should also be possible to detect the shifts in the language exchanges as these gradually express the language of production. (1977a, p. 104)

Chapter VII: Understanding Huebner's Curricular Project

This chapter undertakes several tasks. First it summarizes the way in which Huebner goes about the project of curriculum theorizing. The chapter then shifts to a summary of major responses by several others (Ubbelohde, 1972; White, 1981; Wilson, 1982) to Huebner's work. The final discussion is a summary of Huebner's contributions to the curriculum field.

Huebner's uniqueness as a curriculum worker is perhaps best typified by his somewhat global searching for new forms of inquiry which he hoped would provide vitality for the curriculum field. His concern is not only with teachers, with theoreticians, or with curriculum specialists who see curricular discussion as the linchpin of all that goes on in education; his central concern is with searching for a way to reflect upon and critique the various symbol systems which seek to monopolize education. New vitality, he is assured, lies at the heart of such criticism and reflection on the field. For exploring the collisions and collusions among various competing educational ideologies, Huebner turns his attention to educational discourse in order to find how the diverse understandings of the curriculum field may be disclosed in the ways in which educators converse. Several assumptions accompany his interest in educational discourse.

Huebner assumes that a particular language orientation will be accompanied by attendant interpretations regarding

humanity's understanding of itself and its responsibilities in education. Thus, in Huebner's portrayal, one's curricular language is caught in a dialectical process where a whole array of views of the past and present are conventionalized in the ongoing dynamics between the individual and the social group to which he is being initiated. Differing notions of human responsibility are involved with the ways in which these various symbolic systems, held by various social groups, intercede in shaping children's lives. For Huebner, then, any educational enterprise inescapably involves conflict and power among the people involved. Education is an inherently political act. A dynamic struggle ensues between competing elite groups who desire to alter the symbolic systems of others (and especially of children) through the world of schooling.

In "Politics and the Curriculum" (1962), for example, Huebner is concerned primarily with how it is that decisions and acts in the classroom may be controlled or sanctioned by various social groups (educational elites) who are able to exert directional influence. An educational elite, in order to gain such influence, must have a cohesive foundation or value system for guiding decisions and for shaping their tendencies to take various controlling courses of action in educational environments. Their degree of influence seems to depend for the most part upon their ideological cohesiveness which allows them to project power thus

shaping educational activities.

Although Huebner calls for a pluralism of symbol systems his stance is obviously not a neutral one. In fact he would likely disallow neutrality and would see such a stance as being caught in the failure to recognize educational responsibility. His reactions to particular issues which he identifies as problematic in the curriculum field give rise to his own peculiar and deliberate way of talking about and hopefully redirecting the field.

What is most noticeable in Huebner's exploratory journeys is that his revitalization efforts take a strong critical stance. He suggests that curriculum workers and educators have been accepting the answers from one place (scientism) for too long. He further claims that the narrow symbolic systems of a scientific orientation have been accepted too readily.

The producers of educational theory have frequently failed to recognize the multipurposiveness of educational ideologies and have moved hook, line, and sinker into the search for truth, as defined by scientific criteria. (Huebner, 1962, p. 93)

Huebner contends that other valuable source systems such as philosophy, theology, and humanistic literature have been ignored. It is from these source systems that he hopes to find new life for the curriculum field.

In his revitalization attempts, however, he suggests that two of the five possible value frameworks in the field, the ethical and the aesthetic, tend to offer

more valuable orientations for the framing of educational discourse. These two orientations presumably free the educator, emancipating him from existing patterns of discourse which have become reified conceptual constructs. His initial call for a shift to a more responsible orientation for the curriculum field is typified in the following:

The goal-oriented, person-shaping ideology of curriculum implies that youngsters can be molded to reach predetermined behaviour [technical valuing]. The educational process is more complicated than that. The act of education is an act of human influence--or of "initiation", as Peters would say--and there is nothing more complicated or awesome. (Huebner, 1966b, p. 98)

This call for re-orientation, with its attendant critical stance, is rooted in the pre-historical context of Huebner's work in curriculum. Prior to his first curricular publications, he rejected the positivistic sciences and the domination of educational discourse by social and psychological discourse which he claims is the language used to legitimize and justify this positivistic orientation. Details as to the grounds of this rejection of positivism appear in his work whenever he discusses the psychology based language of "learning" and the sociological science based language of "purpose". A deeper critical note in his writings implies that the positivistic sciences stress the naturalistic world of necessity (the conditioned) and reduces the human spirited aspect of educational activities (the unconditioned) to technical, material meaninglessness. He attempts, therefore, to radically depart from all prior established conditions

and traditions of the positivistic orientation and to reorient the field by engaging in a critical search for the yet to be established in education. Huebner's interpretive stance emerges, therefore, with both a critical and post-critical orientation, for he desires to be both a critic of old meanings and a creator of new ones. By recreating the old, he hopes newness will emerge.

From the foregoing emerges a beginning sense of what Huebner would regard as sufficient warrant for redirecting the educational field, as well as the general direction in which he intends to revamp the field of curriculum. The historically accepted answers to the diverse ways in which man is an educable being and is formed educationally Huebner finds lacking. A deeper notion of humanity's educational responsibility is sought.

In despising the way in which many educators speak of learning as the key to all educational endeavors, Huebner's critical search involves transformations within his own thought in search of a more fundamental sense of educational responsibility. His emphasis on political-ethical influence, he believes, may reaffirm human agency in the affairs of education. Ultimately his notion of responsibility is based on a notion of spiritual transcendence which is the sine qua non of humanity. What is at issue for Huebner can be illustrated briefly.

If one asks any child today what he is doing in school, the child is likely to sum it all in one word--

"learning"--because that's what their teachers tell them they are there for. But Huebner wishes to reject emphatically this popularized notion of learning for it is caught up in the psychological and sociological preoccupation with behavioral change as the explanatory measuring stick of all school existence. In place of the notion of learning, and as a radical substitute for learning theory, Huebner borrows the notion of symbolic transformation from the works of Suzanne Langer and Ernst Cassirer. He goes on to anchor all educational acts in a root notion of human responsibility which he assumes is inescapably involved in any symbolic formation which is undertaken by humans in educational environments. All educators (and all people), therefore, are characterized primarily as symbol forming beings. In fact, the creative act intrinsic to symbolic transformation is the essence of human nature. Hence, Huebner's answer to the question, "Who is humanity?" makes all other curricular questions subordinate ones. Human action and thinking, as educator, is shaped and mediated by prior existing symbolic forms. Language forms, as one kind of symbolic form, play a chief role in how classroom environments are influenced or designed. Of concern then for Huebner are the value bases and systems of rationalization of these guiding symbolic forms and their possibilities for forming or transforming educational activities.

Huebner orients his inquiry of language forms more

in the direction of the social forms of knowledge than in the direction of mental constructs. His inquiry is concerned with the social ways of freeing certain forms of knowledge rather than attending to the ways in which cognitive structures fix forms into a given society. He becomes involved, therefore, in searching for ways to disclose various key notions in regard to the educational exercising of humanity's freedom and responsibility. Sorting out how various symbolic systems are constituted in various ways, not necessarily how they actually come to intercede in the world of classroom action (educational environments), is, therefore, the central strand upon which Huebner weaves much of his work. For example, he states,

Conceptions of purpose, objectives, or learning, if they are needed at all, are components of an ideology, not of the acts in the classroom, although of course a teacher can introduce such notions into the interactions if he wishes. (Huebner, 1962; p. 91)

To undertake symbol system disclosure, Huebner creates his curricular language disclosure model. His scheme for valuing curricular language (technical, political, scientific, aesthetic, and ethical) is comprised, however, of more than merely five different manners of talking about curricular phenomena. As mentioned earlier, the forms of educational discourse are correlated to the holding of certain values and attendant systems of rationalization which may become actualized in educational activities. Forms of discourse are singled out as key to various forms

of social valuing. Hence, these various symbol systems are taken to exemplify various views of humanity's significance and influence in pedagogical interaction. Huebner is concerned with how different understandings of humanness, emerging from different interpretive foundations, lead to various ways of valuing and shaping educational environments and the people in them. Educational environments, therefore, and the human beings in them, are considered to be the final, orienting referent of Huebner's overriding curricular concerns.

Huebner has picked a project. He believes that the social realities of education can and should be altered. The direction of Huebner's praxis-oriented scholarship, therefore, continually critiques the governing interests of positivistic technicism in the curriculum field and sets about a new project for curriculum theory. The decisive link of Huebner's theory to praxis lies in what he has chosen to respond to--primarily the concept of learning.

A significant question arises: Is learning simply a mental manipulation of some psychic mechanisms in response to various arrangements of materials? For Huebner the educational vision must incorporate something more into its controlling language of learning and purpose. But what comprehensive vision orients his reflections on the meaning of curricular phenomena? From the beginning of images, from key words, from clusters of meanings,

a scattered pattern of terms emerges in increased articulation of education as primarily being an act of significant social-guided influence. The child-adult relationship, whether within the boundaries of schooling or without, is the fertile field where human influence tills the fields of vision for the next generation. This act of influence is what Huebner scrutinizes closely. He raises questions of the larger social interests at work in influencing children as follows:

The infant exhibits undifferentiated activity. How is that activity gradually differentiated and focused? How does the stuff of the social-material world shape activity and give it power and direction? . . . Under what circumstances does activity cease being activity for one's self and become activity for another, that is, when does it become alienated labor? (1977a, p. 99).

The term education, therefore, as used by Huebner, seems to refer to that broad induction of children into the world of the adult. More specifically it would seem to be induction for the most part into a specific ideologically unified community. Yet no matter how coherent or multifaceted the communal vision may be, Huebner tends to portray this induction as more of an imposition. The influence of the educational elites he describes seem to have certain dispositions that are fitting to a technical-scientistic and perhaps capitalistic system. Relationships of care and communication change to relationships of production.

In one unpublished work, "Curriculum . . . With

Liberty and Justice for All", Huebner (1974) distinguishes education as "a concern for the future of a person; a future necessarily influenced by others and their works, which make up the individual's present" (1974, p. 1). "Schooling", he says, is "a concern for the intentional mobilization and organization of human and material resources to influence the direction and nature of that education". And because "someone or some social group has used power and scarce resources to intervene in the lives of others", schooling is "inherently political".

Educational activities take place within value frameworks which may be inquired into by attending to the discourse system used. But who imposes these frameworks--the teachers? the students? the materials? For Huebner the value systems are a social phenomenon. Their justification falls back on the elites producing them rather than on any one single discipline which supposedly legitimizes or grounds them. Justification of these value frameworks by the elites is primarily a matter of conversation. So, for Huebner, understanding the social justification of values will provide us with knowledge of the kinds of educational influence deemed acceptable.

For Huebner, the child as well as any other human being ought to be busy constructing meanings from the self and not simply accepting those handed down. But choosing which meanings are created from self and which meanings are given to the self engages the individual

in a never ending dialectic between personally constructed meanings and socially constructed ones. A dilemma as to the limits of individual freedom and autonomy in relationship to social givens and expectations therefore arises.

The critical linkage between child and adult, the key to the interactive patterns of their social relationship, is the communicative relationship. Huebner claims for example, "the forms that language takes between and among individuals, are reflective of the schemata of social relations. Stated from the other side, social relations are constitutive of language functions" (1977a, p. 104).

In "The Moribund Curriculum Field: Its Wake and Our Work" (1976) Huebner suggests that the problem with curricular language is not that the discourse is merely theoretical and hence ineffective, but rather that "it [discourse] accomplishes little in the social world, and has little use value" (p. 154). He goes on to argue that "discourse about educational content is discourse about culture" (p. 158). But the key aspect he highlights relates to the political interests of language. He says:

It is necessary to notice something that has clouded our vision, confused our intentions, and distorted our communication and discourse. This is the inherent tension between the interests of the individual and the social interests that have impact upon that individual--the phenomena of social control. (Huebner, 1976, p. 160)

This question of use value for curricular language can be raised then in relationship to the social significance of Huebner's own discourse. What is its "use value" in the social world of curriculum workers? Huebner is fully aware that language and social change are intimately connected. Change, or reform, no matter how imaginative, requires social acceptance; that is, it must be valued socially to such a degree that social situations and not only discourse systems are in fact altered. If certain utterances or inscribings are ignored, they atrophy and are lost to a civilization. Discourse, if valued collectively, will then work its way into the cohesive language system of the community like a yeast, until significant social change occurs. Language, then, seems to serve in an adherent capacity to the value systems of a community.

In realizing this social character to language, Huebner uses the concepts of negation and negotiation as competitive elements to social valuing of language. At one point he states:

Thus, in my beginning appropriation of Marx's language tools personal choices are made, with the full recognition that if my production is to have social use value it must become part of the social dialectic, and hence [be] critiqued and negated or surpassed by others. (1977a, p. 96)

As part of the social dialectic, language is controlled as it were from the top as acceptable or unacceptable, as appreciable or depreciable according to the value system of the current elite ideologies.

Other curriculum workers do in fact give considerable sanction to the social use value of Huebner's curricular writings (Apple, 1971; Groome, 1980; Mann, 1968; MacDonald, 1971; Pinar, 1974, 1975). Mann claims, for example, that "Huebner's article entitled "Curricular Language and Classroom Meanings" is one of the most promising efforts to propose new substantive structures" (1968, p. 152). He sees the model's usefulness in that each of the five modes identified (the technical, scientific, political, aesthetic, ethical) "could be developed into five distinct complementary substantive structures each with its own set of assumptions and each generating unique bodies of inquiry" (1968, p. 153).

Summary of Several Major Critics to Huebner's Work

Several of the more major responses to Huebner's work are summarized below. Included in these major responses are the works of Robert Ubbelohde (1972), Kirke White (1981), and Angene Wilson (1982).

Ubbelohde (1972) traces how Huebner's attention to the process of valuing in decision making is related to Huebner's concern for design and criticism of educational environments. Huebner's attention to these relationships relates to Huebner's fundamental interest in justification of value principles (curriculum theory). In his analysis of Huebner's particular orientation to the curriculum field Ubbelohde indicates the following findings:

1. The curriculum specialist's tasks include both the design and criticism of specialized environments (Ubbelohde, 1972; p. 205).
2. "The environment must not only serve as the means by which the past and potential future are embodied but it must be responsive or reactive as regards the student." (Ubbelohde, 1972, p. 206)
3. "The controlling agent or agency responsible for designing the environment must make a decision as to the value of various aspects of the past and this calls attention to the process by which such decisions might be reached." (Ubbelohde, 1972, p. 207)
4. Since education itself is caught in 'the individual-world dialectic' "the form of behavior cannot be stipulated in advance. Unlike Tyler, then, Huebner's position does entail a determination of the forms of behavior to be sought as a result of education." (p. 207)
5. Huebner is concerned with the consequences of experiences and leaves the specification of form open. (Ubbelohde, 1972, p. 208)
6. Huebner's position in regard to curriculum planning calls for a process which utilizes a historical methodology. (p. 208)
7. "The 'consequences' of concern to Huebner are in respect to the process of planning--that is, planning must be a freeing activity, one which allows the theorist to control rather than be controlled." (Ubbelohde, 1972, p. 209)
8. "Huebner does not attempt to isolate elements common to all curricular designs or to the curriculum planning process and specify a form for them." (p. 209)

On the basis of his analysis of Huebner's curricular position, Ubbelohde concludes that Huebner's position is 'theoretical' in that he identifies "at least implicitly some phenomena, states of affairs, or processes about which systematized knowledge might be ascertained." (Ubbelohde, 1972, p. 146). He also identifies Huebner's

position as an 'experience' position rather than a 'statement' position, for Huebner views the curriculum as a result or consequence of experience and does not make any statement of a curriculum; that is, Huebner's regard for the curriculum does not involve some sort of 'statement' which could be written down. Huebner's concern with consequences which follow from the experience distinguishes him from those who are concerned with the form of experiences.

Ubbelohde concludes in the final analysis that Huebner's emphasis on analytical thinking about values and on aspects of the curriculum orients Huebner's curriculum theorizing as a concern with the implications of curriculum theory for curriculum design and planning and not with specifying a curriculum or engaging in normative thinking about the values of instruction.

White (1981) identifies three basic thematic emphases to Huebner's work after reviewing twelve of his works. He claims: "Huebner's emphasis has been on educational language, educational environments, and the activities which may occur in them. He has also been concerned with the tasks of a curricularist" (White, 1981, p. 81).

White summarizes his appreciation for Huebner's work as follows:

It is for these two conceptions, the role of psychological thought and language in curriculum talk and curriculum as concern for man's temporality, and also for his insistence upon student rights that I find the reading of Huebner's works to be of value. (p. 85)

White's major emphasis, however, is on the shortcomings of Huebner's work. His more negative comments surface with his conclusion that,

Huebner has not broken from the basic conception of curriculum and instruction set forth by Ralph W. Tyler. While Huebner's words are somewhat different (education instead of learning) and his emphasis is not on objectives but more on educational environments, much of his work is similar to that of Tyler's. The key seems to lie in Huebner's basic acceptance of a curricularist's function as one of design. Once that is established, it appears difficult to break from the parameters of action established by the basic Tylerian questions. (White, 1981, p. 85)

White's conclusion that Huebner has not broken significantly from Ralph W. Tyler's basic conception of curriculum seems to be a misjudgment. In Tyler's conception, learning experiences are chosen in terms of their characteristics for attaining various types of objectives (Tyler, 1949, p. 68-81). In discussing the form of objectives Tyler claims "The most useful form for stating objectives is to express them in terms which identify both the kind of behavior to be developed in the student and the content or area of life in which this behavior is to operate" (Tyler, 1949, p. 46). Tyler also sees learning theory as an essential tool for outlining the nature of the learning process, how it takes place, under what conditions, and what sort of mechanisms operate and the like (Tyler, 1949, p. 41). For Huebner, learning theory has a far more restricted role. Huebner would definitely not see such a comprehensive role--such as Tyler ascribes to learning theory--as a "freeing activity". He argues in fact

that the forms of behavior cannot be stipulated in advance.

In further criticizing Huebner's writings, White rebukes Huebner for the lack of concrete examples in his talk of educational environments and activities. His final appraisal states, "It is my belief, however, that even if Huebner could put his discussions into practical contexts, they would have only marginal influence on the curriculum as designed by most educators" (White, 1981, p. 85). Huebner's contribution, he concludes, "is in the area of language and thought, not in the area of practice." (p. 85)

White, as a practicing teacher reading a theorist, approaches Huebner's work with a strong eye on the instructional implications of Huebner's work. He is frustrated when Huebner's 'new' language does not help answer John Holt's question about what do you do on Monday (White, 1981, p. 85). Such a question seems to be essentially a content question as in "What do I teach?" His objections to Huebner's speaking in generalities and complexities make sense from this classroom-rooted perspective with its accompanying desire for content specification.

White's idea of education seems to remain very much an instructional, method and content oriented one and not a broad human experience oriented one. The whole point of Huebner's criticizing the concept of learning and behavioral objectives is precisely because these deny the centrality of the human agency (both teacher and

student) in the education process. Objectives focus on what the student is supposed to do from the teacher's point of view. Yet the valuative framework behind that choice is hidden. Huebner, with his emphasis on human 'encounter' and on choice-making as inherently political valuing seeks to remind educators clearly and strongly that ethical and moral concerns may never be denied. The focus of instruction in the 'objectives' framework leaps over the student's act of valuing. Any focus on instruction inevitably involves human decision and choice. The process of reaching a conclusion concerning any particular desirable classroom activity involves a judgment of ethical worth.

Although White does a commendable task of attempting to condense the major themes of Huebner's works, his analysis itself does not do justice to the fundamental intent and interests of Huebner's writing for a re-orientation to curricular praxis. Much of Huebner's writing is not meant to serve as a utility base for methods of design; they do not deal with technique. His intent is deliberately to reflect on the value frameworks which guide curricular decisions. The internal motifs of Huebner's works are only partially glimpsed by White's review and appraisal. Ubbelohde's analysis is much more in keeping with the integral character of Huebner's work.

Angene H. Wilson's (1982) article, "Probing the Connection between Modes of Language and Curriculum Theorizing

in Social Studies", is an exploratory probe into the connections between language, curriculum theory, and social studies. The "tool" she uses for this probe is Huebner's six categories or modes of language: descriptive, explanatory, controlling, legitimating, prescriptive, and affiliative.

Wilson's reflections on Huebner's categories of language is a brief but concrete attempt to flesh out Huebner's skeletal sense of what each of these language categories entails. This is a clear attempt to direct Huebner's language interests to research design interests. Although the six distinct categories are not as clearly defined in practice (for there seem to be obvious overlapping interests at times), use of these categories to identify the pure or mixed interests of various situations would be helpful. Wilson's comments and illustrations serve at least to highlight momentarily some of the practical contexts of Huebner's understanding of curricular language which Huebner fails to do himself.

What would the language web of one social studies educator, heading toward theory-building, look like? It might draw heavily on descriptive language first, looking at the kinds of cross-cultural experiences teachers and students bring to social studies classrooms and the kinds of cross-cultural experiences that can happen in classrooms. Another strand would be explanatory language from studies of the impact of cross-cultural experience on high school students, teachers, Peace Corps volunteers, and others. Harvey's descriptive language concerning a global perspective which includes a perspective consciousness and a cross-cultural awareness might become legitimating language. Dewey's stress on the connection between experience and education is also relevant. Perhaps theology,

ecology, and phenomenology would represent helpful affiliative languages.

Out of such a language web would come some theorizing about the meaning of cross-cultural experiences for education. Out of other language webs would come other theorizing, even on the same topic. Perhaps Huebner's language web could be likened to a compost heap. The leaves, the grass, the faded flowers from the vase, the carrot and beet tops from the garden are all mixed together. They rot and ferment and form compost which goes on the garden to fertilize the growth of new plants. Language may be the compost out of which our theorizing grows. What opportunities await. (Wilson, 1982, p. 99)

Although Wilson hints at the fruitfulness of such language categories as being the "compost" for theory generation, the relationship between theory building and the compost of language remains vague. If we use language to facilitate thinking, and if curriculum theorizing is analytical thinking about values as Ubbelohde defines it, then language obviously is a useful "tool" in the making of new theory.

Huebner's Contributions: A Summary

Obviously, the distribution of certain of Huebner's writings has functioned to perform certain actions--the primary one likely being that of persuading others within his limited readership to reflect upon the shortcomings of the dominant means-ends model of learning linked to the Tyler rationale and to direct their attention to aesthetic and ethical considerations as other possible and more fruitful ways for making sense of the curriculum field. In effect, Huebner's writings serve primarily as possible instruments for pondering and contemplating

the curricular theorizing venture as inevitably being a political endeavor, and one calling for deep ethical responsibility. He wants members of the curriculum community to develop more ways of interpreting and understanding the curriculum enterprise.

Others in the field call for similar awareness. One of the strong political voices is that of Michael Apple (1971). He claims, for example, that:

The curriculum field has limited its own forms of consciousness so that the political and ideological assumptions that undergird a good deal of its normal patterns of activity are as hidden as those that students encounter in the schools . . . there must be a continual attempt to bring to a conscious level those hidden epistemological and ideological assumptions that help to structure the decisions they [curricularists] make and the environments they design. (1971, p. 115)

Roland G. Paulston also calls for a move beyond a technical based knowledge of curriculum. He states,

But given the ongoing paradigm clash in explanations of why and how changes in educational systems take place, it now becomes imperative to supplement technical information from the assessments of educational-change efforts with an understanding of relations between ideology and theory choice, with a more sophisticated understanding of how different views of social reality and social change logically lead to predictable linked assumptions about appropriate goals, treatments, and evaluation models for education reform. (Paulston, 1980)

In a more general sense of usefulness or "social use value", we could borrow Decker Walker's (1980) call for new direction.

The best educational scholarship stretches far from the terms of the practical problem into various fields of knowledge--philosophy, psychology, social sciences, and content fields. It returns to the problem with

some terms or ideas that advance our thinking on the original issue, even if the advance is to question the importance of the issue, how it was posed, or whether it is really an issue at all. (1980, p. 76)

Walker calls for more criticism and meta-theory to "disclose implications and assumptions that would otherwise remain tacit in the ways we talk about and interpret curriculum matters" (1980, p. 79). He concludes his barnstorming tour with the following assurance: "After years of near-despair, I am now content with this state of affairs. . . . A rich confusion is the right state for curriculum writing. I don't know how it could do better" (1980, p. 81).

Huebner, in developing a praxis-oriented responsibility theory for curriculum work, illuminates several key ideas related to pedagogy. First, he insists that all educational activity is an act of human influence. Second, he holds that "the people who function in the classroom must focus on the individual student, hence need an ideology which has as its major focus the student and his growth" (Huebner, 1962, p. 94). Third, the responsibility for education goes beyond the classroom, for influence is largely a social policy concern. In reviewing these three themes and their implications for curriculum, we can take note of the contributions and the concerns related to Huebner's call for reform in the curriculum field.

Failing to acknowledge the political reality of

education is the major reason, Huebner argues, that curriculum workers are lost. In "Poetry and Power" he (1975b) states,

Is it because we are afraid to acknowledge that power makes up our center--a power that necessarily comes up against the power of others: principals, parents, kids, board members, text writers. . . . We are afraid, maybe even ashamed to acknowledge that that which we are about as educators is politics: a struggle to maintain, maybe even change through destruction and reconstruction, the world we make with others. (1975b, p. 272)

In holding to this root concept of power, Huebner would claim that it is impossible for a teacher to act in such a way that he or she will not alter a student's tendencies. Intervention is not only permissible; it is undeniable. To educate is to fulfil a calling to the other--to the child. Nurturing the response-ability of the child is inseparable from the care and communicative relationships of the adult.

In Huebner's discussions of the aesthetic and ethical value systems and rationalization schemes, we took note of the importance placed on human creativity and imagination. This capacity, if sufficiently transcendent in character, leads to new possibilities for the individual student as well as for humanity. Fundamental to such transcendent symbolical form-giving must be the form of encounter rooted in love and in the "faith-doubt" dialectic. The irrevocable response-ability to this highest form of encounter is the love response. Pedagogical influence not rooted in this transcendent form of response would

tend toward a usurping of power and would lead to tyranny over others. The encounter with the other must not be one of denial or submission, nor of domination. It must be one of openness and doubt which allows for promise and forgiveness. What Huebner has in mind here is similar to what Paul Ricoeur describes as listening. It is a stance which Ricoeur terms as pre-ethical.

To think nonethically, we must start at a point where the autonomy of our will is rooted in a dependence and an obedience which are not infected by accusation, prohibition, and condemnation. Listening is just such a pre-ethical situation. It is a mode of being which is not yet a mode of doing, and for this reason it escapes the alternatives of submission and revolt. (Ricoeur, 1966)

For Huebner, it seems to be at this foundational transcendent level where humanity's potential and possibility may emerge. The inescapable bonds of human influence seem to overcome the encounters affected by influence and conflict. The response-ability of the other is not denied but is accepted. Humanity's essential beingness, the potential for change, must be authentically present in the encounter. This transcending ability is the key to humanity's spiritual significance.

The acts of educational influence may never occur then in the sense of being a determined choice; rather, they must always be actualized in the sense of valued choice. Such choice, since it is at the heart of educational activity, must be a transcendent freedom-oriented act. It can only be that if it is ethically qualified.

Valued educational activity, therefore, is the key curricular notion used by Huebner. Decision and choice at the level of education activity is where the various competing value systems emerge. This, again, is very similar to Ricoeur's conception of value for Ricoeur states:

The notion of value arises at the stage of ethical theorizing when we must determine our power to be according to the situation, the institution, the structure of economic, political, and cultural life. The notion of value appears at the intersection of our indefinite desire to be and the finite conditions of its actualization. (Ricoeur, 1966, p. 78)

Education, then, involves responsibility in action. Intervention cannot be avoided when certain tendencies and dispositions of pedagogical influence occur. Children need to choose to act in certain ways in given situations. But does Huebner suggest that certain tendencies or dispositions should, in fact, be inculcated in children by adults, by teachers, and the like? At this point it seems that the emphasis to Huebner's ethical considerations would demand that response by the child must be unconditioned and original in order to be free response. And yet his notion of conflict would seem to suggest that some form of negotiation would also be vital to the maximization of freedom for both participants in an encounter. For absolute freedom, neither will, of course, influence the other.

This fundamental idea of human "response-ability", envisioned by Huebner as a possible source of meaning for the curriculum field, has decisive import for the

way in which he views curriculum activity. Curriculum work as transforming activity can be viewed as both product and as activity. There is fixation and change to the curriculum project. The curriculum project, though caught in a historical tradition and a culturally conditioned situation, must accept its essential project as a heed to the call to transcend and transform that cultural conditionedness.

Children, materials, and environment when subject to control and power, must be led forward through a transformative action which allows for a free design to emerge arising from the human ability to choose rather than the ability to influence. And yet all curriculum work as product or as result of previous activity must on principle be transcended again. Distance must be taken from it. This final notion, the call to constantly transcend the already formed, ultimately is the only legitimate attitude one may hold to for Huebner. Intrinsically, such a notion's very roots must adopt a constant attitude of revolution.

With this in mind it seems strange that Huebner should be anxious concerning the sense of crisis in the curriculum field. His fundamental notions for the field assume that education must be in a constant state of crisis if curriculum workers are to serve the transcendent notion of response-ability which he establishes and adopts. If all were well with the curriculum project, then something would be fundamentally awry with humanity; fundamental beingness,

the capacity for creative change, would be in a denial stage.

Educational activities, for Huebner, in so far as they are taken as cultural products, are always a result--an achievement of human controlling and forming power--led by the impulse to freedom. As such it belongs to the conditioned, to the natural and material. It is a given, a result, an artefact of previous activity to be confronted. Yet, from the vantage point of free design, the curriculum worker must be able to enter formatively this conditioned situation which exists. On principle, curriculum workers will have to transcend these situations of conditionedness if curriculum is not to fall victim to necessity. This "culture" then, which has been passed on historically, must be seen as a threat to the curriculum worker's freedom. He or she must not become entrenched in it in any way but, in fact, seemingly must flee from it or be enslaved by it. The only attitude which may legitimately be held to, in fact one which must be held to, is a revolutionary one; culture must be denied and rejected for it must be constantly transcended.

Huebner's primary concern, therefore, is that humanity's transcendent qualities and possibilities are being extinguished. His pronouncements in "Curriculum as a Field of Study" (Huebner, 1966b) strongly toll the bells of crisis. His discussion suggests that if indeed the world of technique has extinguished the world of spirit,

then cultural forms of whatever kind (aesthetic, ethical, political, scientific, or technical) are essentially now natural. Modern humanity is out of control of self, of others, and of nature. Humanity's hopes to shape destiny are powerless dreams, for human existence now grinds inexorably under the fate of a technique which has taken on totalitarian status. But how does all this relate to individual classrooms? For the answer we need to turn to Huebner's considerations of the classroom as a fabricated, conditioning environment.

In contrast to seeing the educational enterprise "as a vast technology for efficiently achieving utilitarian ends" (1965b, p. 20), Huebner claims that the language, methods, materials, and organizational structures that make up the fabricated environment "can be subservient to man, symbolic of his spirit, and tuned to his transcending qualities" (p. 22). He identifies three moral dimensions for the fabricated conditions: service, beauty, and vitality. The first dimension, service, calls for the environment to be adjusted to the individual; "the organization serves the individual student" and not vice versa. The fabricated environment also must have "aesthetic meanings which are above and beyond its service functions" (p. 21). The moral dimension here is beauty. "Each object in the environment, every organizational form can be detached from its world of use and beheld as an aesthetic object" (p. 21). Hence, "beauty" in the fabricated

conditions "can symbolize man's existence, his spirit, the meeting of the conditioned and unconditioned", and in doing so "it points to man's meanings, his sensitivities, his feelings, his possibilities and his failures" (pp. 21, 22). In the third moral dimension, that of vitality, Huebner holds that "the fabricated environment must provide for a vitality, a built-in growth quality, which parallels man's "elan vital". This vitality he relates to humanity's "power of finite transcendence. He [humanity] can constantly be in process of becoming more than he was" (p. 22). What all of this then means for curriculum work is this:

There can never be the curriculum, or the unchanging educational environment. The curriculum must always be in process. To conceive of it as a static entity which must be changed occasionally is to misconceive and hence to interfere with its continuing evolution. The design is never a one-shot job with a state of completion; it is always in process. It must reflect the life of the people responsible for it and the life in the surrounding communities of knowledge, social action, and technology. (Huebner, 1970a, p. 150)

Huebner's call for change, especially for transcendent, freedom-oriented change, runs into difficulty because of the way in which he regards power and conflict. In his initial discussions of power and conflict he adopts the notion that social encounters are primarily dyadic in nature. He discusses conflict in such encounters basically from the side of personal ethics. Yet his chief concern is with the various interrelationships among competing social groups or elites. Political struggle at the level of personal ethics is different considerably from political

struggle at the level of social ethics. In personal ethics the notion of political struggle and conflict perhaps has some validity in regard to forms of social encounters that involve submission, domination and denial but the transcendent form of encounters Huebner calls for are required to get beyond the political notion of influence; what seems to be involved is more a notion of moral influence. To truly maximize freedom for each person in an encounter calls for transcendent moral encounters, not political ones. It would seem then that not a political willing but a moral willing must direct and shape the political directedness of actions.

Huebner's struggle to clarify the relationship between personal ethics and competing ideologies is a justifiable one. One's ethical notions are inextricably linked to larger contexts which Huebner terms "symbolic systems". This raises the issue that ultimately one's ethical stance is situated within even large controlling frameworks of rivalry--that is, orientations beyond the ethical. Huebner characterizes these as ideologies, elites, value systems, or symbolic systems; they are not ethical systems. The ethical is incorporated within their controlling frameworks.

In a similar vein, the power of collective commitment not only to given theories of curriculum but likewise to given curricular practices is more difficult to understand in the sense of a conglomerate of individuals acting as an elite rather than one individual encountering another.

The driving spirit or force of an elite seems larger than any individual's commitment. This form of "super-individual" committedness or "driving spirit" seemingly does not have any legislative reins which any one person pulls.

The pursuit of freedom is admirable. But Huebner's notion of emancipation lacks any significant concreteness; there seems to be little clarity as to the source of emancipation or the substance of it. To be sure there is a strong rather profound call for increased human responsibility but we do not obtain any concrete envisagement as to the content which this form of responsibility is to be united with. Huebner has argued simply that the preoccupation with "learning" does not somehow fit with the pursuit of freedom and responsibility.

Huebner's response, we noted in the previous two chapters, takes on its own peculiar locked-in form. The contextual meanings to Huebner's CLD model are guided by two major motifs which serve as a presuppositional framework to that model: the necessity-freedom motif and the motif of symbolic formation versus learning. The modes of encounter mentioned seem to be caught also in the matrices of these motifs. Also, the web of meanings related to the various value frameworks of Huebner's curriculum language disclosure model are oriented constantly toward either the necessity pole of existence--the world of humanity's technique--or toward the freedom pole--the world of

humanity's spirit. Conversing, crucial to the ways of relating, is similarly affected. In fact, all human symbol formation, seems to produce symbolic forms which adhere to one orientation or the other.

For Huebner, then, humanity, as the prime symbol-producing creature (animal symbolicum) is caught in a world of contradiction and conflict. Humans are responsive to fellow humans in their unique ability to function and relate responsively with a high degree of "symbolicalness" through symbol formation. Foundational ways of being present to, of interacting with, and of influencing others exist. But humanity dwells amidst chaos, not a cosmos. Humanity's symbolic formations impose shifting constellations of orderliness and meaningfulness chained either to the necessity pole or floating from the freedom pole.

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FIGURE 1: HUEBNER'S CURRICULAR LANGUAGE DISCLOSURE MODEL

	VALUES	RATIONALITIES
TECHNICAL	-mobilizing material and human resources to meet ends -control of quality of production, costs, resources, efficiency, organization -values change in student behavior	-means-ends -economic and efficiency rationales legitimized by language of learning and purpose
POLITICAL	-values power, control, and manipulation -activities valued for respect and support -seeks to maximize power and influence -points to conflict	-seeks social sanction -need for influence, trust, and respect in order to accomplish work effectively
SCIENTIFIC	-valued for new facts, technologies -techniques, and knowledge produced -values hypotheses testing -changes in teaching strategies, and new assertions	-need of better warranted assertions -maximize information and knowledge -scientific methodology action research, controlled experimental design
AESTHETIC	-valued for symbolic and aesthetic meanings -values the unconditioned spontaneity, uselessness -wholeness and design (totality, unity, balance, harmony, composition) -symbolic meanings of humanity as a life form	-continual caging of chaos -psychical distance or non-instrumentality -beauty (harmony and form) -truth as unveiled meaning criticism
ETHICAL	-valued primarily as an encounter of human beings -value of the act per se life revealed and lived -meeting the other as a thou (subject-to-subject) -lived experience	-response - ability -conversation -influence, communion promise, fulfillment possibility, forgiveness, -mystery, doubt, awe, unknown openness and acceptance

FIGURE 2:

EDUCATIONAL ELITES, IDEOLOGIES, AND CLASSROOM REALITIES




FIGURE 3: FIVE BASIC MODES OF ENCOUNTER OR RELATING




FIGURE 4:
CURRICULAR LANGUAGE PROBLEMS: DESCRIBING AND VALUING





FIGURE 5: SIX POSSIBLE CATEGORIES OF LANGUAGE



REFERENCE NOTES

1. By curricular language disclosure model, I refer to Huebner's proposal in "Curricular Language and Classroom Meanings" (Huebner, 1965a) to clarify "the framework or systems which may be used to value educational activity". In terming this reformulation for curricular language a "disclosure model" I borrow a distinction which Mann (1968) makes between picturing models and disclosure models.

The models employed to disclose meanings in phenomena are not the result of operation upon data, but are rather the result of extensions, transformations, and deployments of intuitively held personal knowledge. . . . Curriculum, to select one of the most important views, is a form of influence over persons, and disclosure of meanings in a curriculum are disclosures about the character of an influence. (Mann, cited in Pinar, 1975, pp. 144-145)

I take Huebner's proposed curricular language disclosure model to be an attempt at disclosure of five forms of influence over persons in education.

2. This distinction is commonly found in general educational literature. One particular statement of this distinction can be found in Robin Barrow's (1976) Common Sense and the Curriculum.

Barrow sees knowledge as being of two forms: propositions arrived at by a combination of logic and reference to empirical evidence (empirical based knowledge) and propositions that can be determined by logical

reasonsing (conceptual based). In addition to these two forms of knowledge, Barrow asserts that "there are also two basic interpretive attitudes to the world and a number of distinct kinds of awareness" (p. 51). He labels these two basic interpretive attitudes as the religious and the scientific: the religious view subscribes to articles of faith that act as fundamental axioms that are not scientifically demonstrable. The scientific attitude, however, "takes nothing on trust" hence--"there is no mystery, merely a degree of ignorance which is in principle capable of final resolution by scientific enquiry". (p. 51)

3. Tyler's basic rationale, the behavioral objectives model is reviewed more extensively in Chapter II of this study.
4. Ubbelohde (1972) defines curriculum theorizing as "analytical thinking about values" (p. 422). The term theorizing also suggests the following:
 - a. a movement toward full-fledged theory in the post-Kuhnian sense of pre-scientific.
 - b. not yet acceptable or established theory.
 - c. conveyance of a dynamic and edifying sense rather than a static sense for theory in formation.

5. This third aspect which relates to Huebner's curricular language understandings is described by him in "The Task of the Curriculum Theorists" (Huebner, 1975c). This work appeared in mimeograph form in 1968, tying it close chronologically to the interest expressed in "Curricular Language and Classroom Meanings (1965a). These particular categories focus more on actual functions of various forms of language. For the purposes of this study I am not regarding these categories as part of the disclosure model. The significance of these categories, however, is highlighted briefly in the review comments on Angene Wilson's work. (see Chapter VII, pp. 151-153)
6. Two helpful overviews of the underlying assumptions to the behavioral objectives model in the midst of diverse orientations to curriculum are provided by Ernest R. House. (1978) "Assumptions Underlying Evaluation Models" and Rolland G. Paulston (1980) "Evaluation Reflections: Evaluation and Explication of Education Reform".
7. These modes of human relationship and the modes of conversing developed in Huebner's later work, render similar patterns. The modes of encounter, the values systems, the attendant rationalization schemes, as well as the functional categories of language later

identified may have a compatible framework.

8. This study will not review in detail Huebner's later works and his clearer interest in social critique. Those portions relevant to his language interests are included.

9. Venerable sees the curriculum as the core unit of the educational process. He outlines "the fundamental necessities for the existence of a curriculum" as follows:

First, there must be a learner--someone to build into his own being whatever is available to learn. Without the learner there would be no reasons for the existence of education. Next, there must be the subject matter, that is, the things to be learned. In its broadest definition it includes not only the knowledge of fact, but the skills, understandings, attitudes and appreciation that the learner gains. . . . Then there is the learning process itself, the way in which the subject matter is taken in by and becomes a part of the learner. This is a complicated process and, at best, is only partially understood by the psychologists and philosophers. And finally, there is the teaching agency, a subtle but necessary part of the whole learning procedure. Such an agency may fittingly be called the catalyst of the learning situation. . . . In its broadest aspects, the term teaching agency involves much more than schools and teachers. Included must be the society within which the child lives, with all its folkways, mores, and value systems. (Venerable, 1967, p. 21)

10. Langer claims "Ideation proceeds by a . . . principle of symbolization. . . . Symbolization is pre-rational, but not pre-rational. It is the starting point of all intellection in the human sense, and

is more general than thinking, fancying, or taking action. For the brain is not merely a great transmitter, a super-switchboard; it is better likened to a great transformer." (Langer, 1979, p. 42)

11. Huebner is making reference here to John S. Mann's paper "Influences of Marxism on Curriculum Theory", a paper presented to professors of Curriculum, New Orleans, April, 1976, and to the work of Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis entitled Schooling in Capitalist America, New York: Basic Books, 1975.

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